This workshop constituted the third in a series of workshops organised by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty on policy issues around migration and development. The earlier workshops were held in 2004 (for policy makers from across Whitehall) and in 2005 (for the UK voluntary sector). This workshop brought together participants from a variety of governmental departments including DFID, FCO, Home Office, HM Treasury, DWP, and others including representatives from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the High Commissions of Australia and Canada. The participants were seated cafe style around four tables to facilitate discussion.

**Migration and Development: Where Next After New York?**

*Richard Black*

Richard presented an overview of the changing thinking on migration, and some of the key issues that might be of concern to policy makers. Thinking on migration has come a long way from the traditional ‘root causes’ perception of migration as rooted in the failure of development, or being an unwanted side effect of development. It has since become apparent that poor people routinely take recourse to migration. It is a strategy people employ to better their livelihood options, and could have a positive impact on individual and community well-being. It is thus increasingly viewed much more positively -- as *not* a problem, but part of the solution. This alternative view suggests that migration makes a substantial contribution to economic growth. The tendency, particularly in the media, has been to train the spotlight on the impact (strain) of migrants on public services, rather than on the largely positive impact of migration on the economy.

The Home Office (Making Migration Work for Britain), the EU and the Global Commission on International Migration have also highlighted the advantages of migration in recent years. The EU, for instance, sees migration having great potential for development given ‘appropriate policies’. What might these policies be? Given that migration can have developmental impacts, the three critical questions that need to be addressed are: how can the benefits from migration be maximised whilst minimising costs; how can a coherent approach to migration between sending and receiving countries (e.g. through influencing recruitment policies) be ensured; and what options are practical and, equally importantly, politically feasible.

Richard then went on to highlight three key issues that come up again and again in discussions around migration today -- remittances, brain drain and migrants’ rights.
Remittances: Remittances have been a steady and growing resource, and globally constitute almost twice development aid today. The biggest remittance receivers are middle-income countries, but remittances constitute a proportionately much larger share in poorer and smaller economies, and are particularly critical to these countries as they tend to attract lower rates of foreign direct investment. Of course remittances are not, and must not, be treated as a substitute for aid.

The banking sector has a key role in introducing some transfer policy coherence to get remittances to the poorest at a low cost. Extending banking services to the poorest is also a development priority. Remittances do not always go through the formal sector, as the informal sector is cheaper, and rather than trying to replace a well functioning system, only in order that it operates in the formal sector, it might be better to bring existing systems to follow international standards, particularly with regard to, for instance, transparency issues, money laundering or terrorism links.

It is equally important to ask who is remitting. Studies have indicated that the migrant’s legal status at the destination can have a bearing on amounts remitted. Thus, a study in Ghana suggests that legal migrants are likely to accrue more savings, and remit. On the other hand, poorer people from Ghana have few legal channels for migration abroad. It is only the highly skilled who are able to migrate internationally.

Financial remittances, however, do not stay the same over a period of time; they tend to peak and start declining as migrants settle at the destination. It is also important to bear in mind that remittances are not just money; they also include ideas, trade etc.

Brain Drain/Gain: It is critical that the legitimate aspirations of people to move be recognised. The solution to ‘brain drain’, therefore, cannot be in stanching all such migration flows. Discussions of ‘brain drain’ must instead engage with the structures of training, labour markets and demand, and the dynamic impacts these lead to. In the case of Ghana, for instance, 60 percent of Ghanaian doctors, and 25 percent of nurses, leave the country after having received their training there. A large proportion of these medical professionals also seek further training in their country of destination in the first instance. It is a complex issue, requiring one to balance between individual aspirations and what is good for a country. What is imperative, however, is that some of the benefits of training medical staff also accrues to the poorer countries involved.

Discussions on migration today look very much like earlier discussions on trade. Indeed, as for trade, liberalising migration might be the way to go. Economic modelling suggests that liberalisation of migration regimes could lead to a substantial increase in global welfare to the tune of about USD 356 bn per year, accruing about equally to developed and developing countries.

Migrant Rights: The Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers has not been signed by any receiving country. Other existing conventions are equally relevant for migrant workers, such as the convention of rights of children -- as children migrate with their families and autonomously. Meanwhile, governments are considering dual citizenship issues and voting rights with a view to promoting diaspora policies.
In the south, rights tied to place of residence are a common feature in some of the larger countries like India and China, and accessing citizenship thus becomes an issue even in the course of migration within these countries. The value of ID cards for migrants is now being debated, though this could potentially have positive or negative consequences. Other forms of protection for migrants is being sought, e.g. through the building of hostels for poor people in transit, or training the police to protect the rights of migrants.

Richard concluded with three questions: How can we make UK policy on migration coherent with development goals? Can we, for instance, still achieve development goals if we restrict migration and force return, making a mockery of any attempts at building North-South partnerships. In trying to make migration policies consistent with development, there is also the question of what lead the UK government, for instance, might give to other countries. Can the Global Migration Forum keep its focus on international migration and development? And can we promote a more mature public debate about migration?

DISCUSSION POINT: What kinds of policies could promote coherence or be problematic for coherence?

- There is a role for much more joined up thinking between departments on their objectives and mandates.
- While there appears to be no dearth of an evidence base, government decisions are ultimately political and may not be in line with what the evidence shows.
- The government is often acting within short-term policy constraints, and is often confused about long-term strategy. Concrete proposals and evidence on migration and development, and possible win-win schemes, might steer the government towards a more open approach to migration rather than its current concern with restricting it.
- Coherence for the sake of coherence may not, however, be such a good thing. For example, if there was a lot of consensus within various parts of the government, DFID may not have got as far as it has.
- There are other constraints around coherence. For instance, DFID’s constituency is UK-based and country-based, but other UK departments are UK-led with the potential for tension there. But there are principles and sectors from where policy coherence might start -- e.g. banking, pensions etc.
- There is a question about coherence with what -- for instance, while current UK government policies on migration are coherent enough in relation to the EU and the new accession countries, it is departing from earlier policies on other countries (such as Commonwealth countries) with equal or greater development needs.
- Might be useful to start with the question as to what makes the greatest impact on poverty reduction and go from there
- The lack of constructive debate on the issue, and lack of public awareness around migration is hampering what might be politically feasible.
TOWARDS A PROGRESSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR MIGRATION

Heaven Crawley

Heaven presented her vision of what a ‘progressive’ approach to migration might look like, stressing the issues of process, and envisioning what kind of society we want to be, not just nationally but also internationally. The aim of the session was to encourage policy makers to ‘step back’ from the day-to-day realities of policy making and delivery in order to first identify what it is exactly we are trying to achieve.

In this context, she raised the question as to what is meant by ‘managed migration’, an expression which is used repeatedly by politicians and policy makers alike to explain the current approach to migration. What are we trying to manage, and is it really manageable? Current policy discourses around migration seem to start with the assumption that there is a problem and that a ‘managerialist’ approach is the solution.

Heaven suggested that a genuinely progressive approach to migration would have several strands. It would seek to deliver social justice, nationally and internationally. It would work towards improved distributional outcomes and attempt to reduce inequalities.

There are several persuasive arguments for why we should move towards a more progressive approach. In the international context, for instance, one of the impacts of globalisation has been increased migration. Migration has become a reality of the world we live in. While governments have been directing all their energy to putting up controls, these are very expensive, both financially and terms of human costs.

In the UK, governments have tried to give some coherence to migration policies by being tough on actual or perceived abuses of the migration system while promoting labour migration. The current approach to migration is largely built on an artificial distinction between ‘good’ or ‘economically productive’ migration versus that which is not. Further, ‘good’ migration or economic migration is perceived as ‘manageable’. This is reflected in the increasing need for government to want to demonstrate its toughness on ‘bad’ forms of migration (primarily asylum, irregular migration and family reunion) in order to persuade the public of the merits of allowing a certain level of ‘good’ migration (as the government would be seen to be in control). Thus, migration is very much presented as a problem that needs to be ‘managed’. And this leads to a vicious circle of perceptions and effects, with the government giving the public messages about the need to be tough, the public believing migration is a ‘problem’ and reacting to it, the government then trying to respond to this and so on.

Heaven then went on to briefly discuss ten principles which might underpin a progressive approach to migration:

1. ‘Mechanisms for economic migration to the UK should be open, transparent, simple and non-discriminatory’. It could be argued that this has already been achieved – in the sense that economic migration routes into the UK have increased – but the new points system remains complex and certain groups remain unable to access the labour market because of discrimination based on nationality.

2. ‘Seeking protection from persecution and human rights abuse is a fundamental right that must be respected’. There is a shift here in what is sought to be achieved -- measure not how many kept out, but how many protected.
3. ‘Migration should be linked to international development goals’. Economic migration, circular flows etc have the potential to do this.

4. ‘Family reunion is a human right and a key mechanism for facilitating long-term integration’. Could facilitate integration though this might be deemed a ‘bad’ migration.

5. ‘The regularisation of migrants already living in the UK without status is necessary to prevent their exploitation, to facilitate integration and increase public confidence’. This has the potential to increase public confidence though commentators might hold a contradictory view.

6. ‘Integration policies should provide access to the labour market and participation in political and civil structures’.

7. ‘All people residing in the UK should have access to civil and social rights, health, education and housing’.

8. ‘Migrants are experts on migration’. We do not often genuinely, rather than tokenistically, engage with migrants. Instead migrants are forced to fit into categories pre-determined by governments.

9. ‘Racism by host communities in the UK is not the fault of migrants’.

10. ‘The impact of policies to manage migration should always be properly evaluated, particularly where different policy measures have been implemented in quick succession’. There is little evaluation of programmes in cross-departmental terms.

DISCUSSION POINT: Participants were asked to think about and discuss the principles in an abstract way i.e. not pre-determined by actual or perceived policy implications. They were then asked to assess each progressive principle in relation to whether it might be (i) unproblematic (ii) have policy implications which are difficult to deliver or (iii) be worthy but inconsistent with current priorities within different departments. The following points emerged from the discussion:

- A principle on engaging public confidence itself needed i.e. not just a general back-drop for the progressive principles.

- Control and management are not bad per se because they can also support social justice principles.

- Principle 1 -- clause ‘non-discriminatory’ problematic. There is a basis/measure for selection within migration categories, and so discrimination on some count is already built into the process of ‘managing’ it. Might use the term ‘consistent’ instead of non-discriminatory.

- Principle 2 -- unproblematic for all groups.

- Principle 3 -- link to international developmental goals needs to be established.
• Principle 4 -- positive response, except question as to whether family reunion a human rights issue. Also, might be different for settled migrants and first-generation migrants

• Principle 5 -- questions around policy. It is a public policy question -- is there evidence that amnesties encourage irregular migration. Also question around public confidence

• Principle 6 -- clearer wording required around ‘participation’ -- nationality/citizenship would affect degrees of participation. Take time-scale into account -- temporary vs permanent migrant etc.

• Principle 7 -- principle sound but there are issues around public confidence. Probably applicable once people have legal status. Would this be for emergency or non-emergency health care?

• (Might be useful to talk of rights and responsibilities in relation to principles 5-7)

• Principle 8 -- Wording problematic. Migrants are not necessarily [the only] experts, and anecdotal evidence not sufficient to construct policy, but do need to listen to them more

• Principle 9 -- Both host communities and migrants could generate hostile environments

• (Principles 8 and 9 are not really principles but statements)

• Principle 10 -- Could stop at ‘evaluated’. While evaluation is important, it is also important to understand the evidence before formulating and implementing policy

In conclusion, Heaven pointed out that it is important that across and within government departments there is agreement on principles before formulating policy so there is clarity on what it is that we are seeking to achieve. Policies on one aspect of migration will impact on others, and so it is important to consider the principles together. The tendency is for policies to be UK-focused, without seeing the international context. There is a need to move away from dichotomies of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ migration. Migration is not good or bad in itself; it is often the policies themselves that generate ‘good’ or ‘bad’ forms of international migration and their associated impacts.

**MANAGING MIGRATION FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?**

*Danny Sriskandarajah*

Danny began his presentation by asking how policies could shape developmental outcomes, or how can migration policies be made more development-friendly. Can migration be ‘mainstreamed’ into policy concerns? Would it be possible to convince the public of the benefits of migration?

Migration can result in mixed outcomes for development. Migration can lead to global economic efficiency. For sending countries, it increases the inflow of foreign exchange through remittances. It could, potentially, lower the levels of unemployment. It could lead to investments in technology, increased trade, and create human capital. And individuals hope to meet their aspirations through migration. On the negative side are loss of skills etc (see slide).
Governments could do a lot to affect this stylised balance sheet. There are several tools governments could use but they are far from making use of these. These might take the form of codes of conduct for recruitment, bilateral temporary migration arrangements (such as the recent one between Italy and Sri Lanka), retention in ‘brain strain’ hotspots, increasing fiscal transfers to developing countries, creating circular flows that bring in skills, money, contacts and networks, lowering the cost of remittance transfers, using remittances to strengthen the financial system, enhancing the impact of remittance matching schemes, and enhancing the role of diaspora through development cooperation, using talents and interests of diaspora groups.

If there are so many tools available to governments, the question is why they do not do more with them. Several reasons might be cited for this. First, UK immigration laws and policies have been created to serve UK interests, with immigration policy directed by the Home Office. Secondly, arguing that immigration to the UK is good because it is good for developing countries would be very difficult politically. Thirdly, there are no clear discernible effects of migration to put on the table, and no tools available as yet to judge what works. Tweaking policies will not address developmental concerns. Indeed, it could instead lead to ‘compassionate racism’. Finally, international cooperation on migration is not easy.

The challenges we are then faced with are the following:

1. Mainstreaming migration into development -- need to focus on the migration-development nexus. There is no agreement on impact of migration on development. Instead the focus has been on root causes or attempts have been made to tinker with individual migration decisions
2. Mainstreaming development into migration policies. Here there has been a lack of joined-up thinking. There is a tension between migration and development priorities and between the bodies dealing with each of these
3. Building broader partnerships -- many more partners need to be involved in designing and implementing policies in this area.

DISCUSSION POINT: Which of the four scenarios can be most convincingly put forward as a policy option for the UK government that is effective and feasible?

a) Restrictions on highly-skilled migrants from particularly vulnerable countries (e.g. recruitment code or numerical quotas)
b) Additional temporary low-skill migration programmes from poor countries
c) Increased development assistance to bolster wages and conditions of key workers in vulnerable countries
d) Re-allocation of some tax collected from some highly-skilled workers to development programmes in countries of origin

Scenario a: Two groups found this to be inherently discriminatory. Stopping people moving is not the solution as people will always find ways to come.

Scenario b: Need to establish what benefits, for whom, on a bilateral basis. More of a runner as it is ‘temporary’ low skilled migration. But need to show demonstrated need for this. May be viable as shortages develop. Three of the groups considered this an option.
Scenario c: This seemed the only feasible option for one group, and most saleable option for another, though demonstrating tangible benefits would be an issue.

Danny asked the groups how spending aid on ‘c’ could be defended, particularly since key workers from developing countries were already educated and better-off relative to the rest of the population in their countries.

In conclusion, Danny argued that ‘managing’ migration must take into account all the actors and interests that such policies would touch on, including sending/transit/receiving and secondary countries, migrants themselves, diaspora groups etc. To effectively ‘manage’ migration, developmental inequalities and disparities in political conditions need to be corrected. Else, there is a risk that the poorest countries will get stuck in a ‘migration trap’, with brain strain, few incentives for return or circulation, little potential for productive use of remittances etc. Demographic trends indicate that importing workers will only continue into the foreseeable future, so it is best to ensure a sustainable supply. What is required now is empirical evidence and a new methodology to better understand the net impacts of migration.

MAXIMISING DIASPORAS’ DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL: REMITTANCES AND BEYOND (ARE WE THERE YET?)
Chukwu-Emeka Chikezie

The aim of Chukwu-Emeka’s presentation was to provide a diaspora perspective on the migration-development nexus, and help chart a way forward on how best to engage with diasporas. He opened with some reflections on the High-Level Dialogue. The focus on ‘civil society’ was limited to rights issues rather than a discussion of concrete ideas to move forward the migration and development debates. There was very little engagement with diasporas or migrant groups. There is a need for these groups to organise and get some coherence.

The presentation provided an overview of milestones in engagement with diaspora. The UK government’s own statement of interest in engaging with the diaspora began with the first white paper in 1997. But while there have been a number of papers written on engaging with the diaspora, and lots of work on remittances, engagement directly with diaspora groups has been rare, and remittances constitute only one way of engaging with migrant populations or diaspora groups. Skills, hometown associations, policy inputs could all be worked into any kind of engagement with diaspora organisations.

DISCUSSION POINT: Why the hesitation in engaging with diaspora groups? Three questions were posed:

- What concrete development outcomes might you hope to achieve by engaging with the diaspora?
- What are the obstacles you need to overcome to get there?
- What practical support is needed to get things moving?

Main Discussion Points Emerging:

Potential

-- Work with diaspora can inform policy making
-- Can provide practical support/information to migrants and diaspora groups

-- Important to encourage people to go back, share knowledge and build networks. Might be worthwhile looking more into circulating schemes and exploring what might work.

-- There might be a role for government in facilitating trade (for instance, with demand for Nigerian goods in the UK, need to import these from Nigeria).

Limitations

-- Lack of clarity in objectives as to why engage with diaspora (though clarity in some parts of DFID, for instance, finance sector working on remittances). Development policies generally shaped through country offices. Remittances are seen to be helping communities, through for instance, investments in community projects.

-- There is a need for diaspora partners but these groups are rather heterogeneous and working under constraints of divergent objectives and pulls from different sections

In conclusion, Chukwu-Emeka flagged up the following points:

- Important to deal with diaspora to leverage experience already there.

- Issue not of engaging with diaspora for itself. Rather, governments engage with various groups, of which diaspora would constitute an important category. Trade unions, for instance, understand issues around jobs, remittances and portability. Thus migrants and diaspora are certainly not the only experts, but they nevertheless are important stakeholders who could be consulted.

- Important to look at ‘jobs’ narrative -- link development with jobs.

- Look at other critical sectors, like education, health and gender.

- Current constituency for development does not include migrants and diaspora (e.g. no efforts to engage these groups in programmes like Make Poverty History). Need to first shift public perceptions about Africa.

- Build a new constituency with new sets of actors including diasporas, governments and business (not so far included in development discourses).

- Promote policies that facilitate individual and ‘collective’ remittances and community development; support business development; and knowledge transfer with movement between sending and destination sites.

- There is a key role for diaspora intermediaries, though they need to be supported through capacity building and infrastructure support. Work together to achieve greater good, though relations with diaspora groups can and never will be substitutes for partnerships with the Global South.
SKILLED INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: CUTTING EDGE APPROACHES

Ron Skeldon

The attempt on the part of most developed country governments has been to try and attract the best and brightest while keeping out the unskilled. Indeed, the UK is exceptional in that it has been thinking about the consequences of ‘poaching’.

Arguments for keeping skilled people in their countries of origin might be described under the 4 Cs: (i) control the outflow; (ii) compensation policies; (iii) create more human capital and (iv) connect with transnational communities (after Devish Kapur and J. McHale).

One approach to the thinking around brain drain (e.g. Oded Stark) is that it could potentially be good for the country of origin. Aspirations to migrate will stimulate larger and larger numbers of people to seek qualifications in areas which offer opportunities to move. However, not everyone will be able to migrate, leaving behind a greater stock of educated capital than would have been the case if migration was not happening. However, there is no clear empirical evidence for this yet.

Certainly, the evidence for a brain drain is not universal. Forty years ago, increasing numbers of students began to leave from the economies of East Asia. Some 20 percent of medical interns and residents in the US were from overseas, drawn heavily from Taiwan and South Korea. Yet, despite the exodus of large numbers of the best and brightest both those economies have shown astonishing economic growth. It would be difficult to argue that their growth would have been even faster had the skilled migrants stayed at home.

So what are some of the contentious issues around skilled migration today?

1. International migrants still constitute only a small 3-4 percent of the world’s population, of whom skilled migrants constitute a very small proportion. Internal brain drain might be much more significant than international brain drain and villages are being drained of their most dynamic members through rural-to-urban movements.

2. There are also movements from the sector but not from the country. Thus, some countries might find a large number of vacancies in education, for instance, but no corresponding out-migration, the question then revolves round conditions, remuneration, and career prospects in the sector rather than in emigration.

3. There tends to be an assumption that highly skilled migration is a separate stream from unskilled migration. But all big cities attract skilled migrants and unskilled migrants, who provide the services to keep the skilled migrants going. Thus these are integrated streams and must be looked at together.

4. Primacy is so often given to the agency of individual migrants in migration policy. However, importance also needs to be assigned to structures. Skilled migrants move to where economic, social and political structures help them maximise their potential.

The presentation went on to focus on the health sector, which in many ways is thought to be an exceptional sector as everyone needs a good health sector. The developed world will continue to need health personnel in the foreseeable future. Four specific issues need to be raised:
Where is the training taking place

Places of origin of the skilled -- where are the health personnel coming from (e.g. mostly from urban areas) while the need for health services might be highest in rural areas.

What are the linkages between the state of the health sector and the state of health of a population (these are not the same thing and may share a more tenuous relationship than is often thought)

The migration of health professionals from the developed to the developing world and the return of doctors

Origins and destinations of the skilled: Health professionals coming largely from middle-income countries. But their loss is much more significant for smaller economies. Not all training takes place in the country of origin and there are variations in where the training takes place. For example, in India they are largely trained in situ, but medical personnel from other countries might receive most of their training in the developed world.

Sources of funding. An assumption exists that that the state of origin pays, but increasingly costs of training are being borne privately, by individuals and their families or by destination states and institutions. The skilled largely come from wealthier families, who are also able to afford to send them abroad for training. Or, they may be paid through private foundations. In the US in 2004, for instance, 45 percent of students are funded by the universities themselves, up from just 10 percent in 1979 according to the American demographer Mary Kritz. Training in destination areas solves the question of accreditation -- if the skilled are trained in situ, there is no need for funds to be spent on bridging courses.

Most of these medical personnel are not coming from rural areas. As such, their emigration does not lead to a reduction in services in rural areas. In Ghana, two-thirds of the medical trained are from Greater Accra and Kumasi. In Haiti, 91 percent are from Port-au-Prince.

The question then is how can the rural areas be serviced? Would this require countries to draw on the developed world, or on the diaspora? Are highly skilled and trained doctors needed in these areas? Training a separate tier of medical personnel for local requirements might raise ethical issues -- it might be dubbed training for a second-rate medical service. But is it possible to develop a multi-tier system, where the possibility exists for personnel to be trained to a lower level of skill for the local market, but with the opportunity to go in for higher–level training at a later stage so that they are not condemned to a particular tier of the system. A need for barefoot doctors relevant to the local market only clearly exists.

The relevance of the advanced medical sector for health can also be questioned; Ivan Illich once famously described the medical establishment as a threat to a population’s health. The health of a population is hardly determined by the health sector alone but also by the contributions of agronomists, irrigation engineers, sewage engineers and others -- a whole development package ensures a healthy population.

Doctors abroad could potentially be a reserve countries could draw on. For example, there are 35,000 registered doctors of Indian origin in the US, whom the Indian state could call upon. They can travel back on a shorter or longer-term basis to offer services in the rural sector.
Thus there could be issues of return and outsourcing. Return begins to happen when there is something to return to. Taiwan had a return rate of 5 percent of its students going abroad in 1965; now it is 35-40 percent.

In East and South Asia, there are regional centres of excellence developing, predicated on development in these cities, but also on demand from developed countries. For example, Bumrungrad Hospital in Bangkok, first of Thailand’s ‘internationally accredited’ hospitals, treating 850,000 patients, 300,000 of whom are international (not clear how many of these are based in Bangkok and how many come from overseas for treatment). These hospitals seek both to retain skilled people and to attract them from overseas. For overseas patients, however, the issue of after-care remains problematic.

The developed and new areas emerging in the developing world are increasingly in competition for skills. New synergies are developing in the field of education as well. For instance, Nottingham university has a campus in China many developed-country universities are expanding into some developing countries and centres of excellence are emerging at certain key points in the “global South”.

DISCUSSION POINTS:

Managing Skilled Migration

Policies of ethical recruitment have been implemented but questions remain about their effectiveness and their own ethical approach. Discriminating on the basis of national origin is hardly an ethical approach to migration management. Also, policies of legal restrictions on recruiting may force the skilled into irregular channels of migration.

Engaging with Diaspora

There are possibilities to engage with the skilled diaspora, but question of what are the incentives to return? Do diaspora groups always have links in country of origin?

Personnel are often willing to forego salary to go and practice abroad for brief periods, but no institutional structures yet available to facilitate this. AFFORD’s experience has been that interested Sierra Leoneans were paying AFFORD a fee to be able to go and practice in Sierra Leone for brief periods. Institutional structures and flexibility the key issues here. Can flexibility, for example, be built into the NHS so as to promote circulation of the skilled?

Those returning for short periods also sometimes interested in training or providing the training of trainers.

Outsourcing

Centres of excellence might emerge more in middle-income countries as investments in R&D are still low in low income countries, and the sustainability of such centres in the longer term may be a problematic issue.

What are the benefits of Centres of Excellence for host countries? Doctors very often worked part-time with the most deprived communities. Also a number of spin-off effects, including creation of supply chain and layers of support and service categories.
CLOSING REMARKS
Richard Black

The two presentations in the morning looked at migration broadly, particularly at the policy side, and argued that while there were opportunities in migration, it was not a panacea to the world’s problems. The sessions in the afternoon focused on more specific issues. Danny presented four policy options. The discussions that followed showed one group enthusiastic for investing in development, which they felt was beneficial anyway, while another saw the greatest good coming from bilaterally negotiated temporary mobility schemes.

Chukwu-Emeka brought to the fore issues around engagement with diaspora groups. He addressed issues around how to establish working partnerships, and with whom -- home governments, civil society actors, DFID -- not just for altruistic reasons but also for hard economic reasons.

Ron touched on the complexities surrounding skilled migration, with a focus on newly emerging regional centres of excellence, and the argument for two-tiered training.

Richard then made three observations. First, while the discussions focused around policy coherence, there was very little discussion of the UK rolling out the five-tier points-based system. What policy coherence do we see here? Across each of these different tiers, what might the developmental impact be? Very often it is assumed that low-skilled migration is good for developing countries, but the migration of the highly skilled problematic. Is this always true? What if migration were to be liberalised, following the example from trade? And what if preferential treatment were given to migrants from countries that might have adopted a similar system? For example, Ghana giving points to returning migrants etc.

Second, in politics, certain things appear not to be feasible. Migration has moved from the arena of low politics (an issue for civil servants to grapple with) to high politics, where politicians of every hue perceive it as something they must have a view on. Five years from now, Gordon Brown could be PM with Hilary Benn as deputy, and there might be a policy environment for pushing for further liberalising migration. Or it might be David Cameron in power, who might show as much enthusiasm for hugging a migrant as he has recently shown for hugging a hoodie!

Third, what next after New York. It is not clear where the HLD process is going or what it will do for migration discussions, to be continued next in Brussels. If the UK government agree to say something, we might be able to move the discussions forward. There are two possibilities here: look at specific win-win-win solutions, or argue for a more general liberalisation of movement at a global level. It does not have to be a case of all or nothing. Changes are already happening with the EU with its expansion in ways that could not have been foreseen 20 or 30 years ago.

This workshop write-up and accompanying documents are also available at http://www.migrationdrc.org/news/drc_reports.html
# Migration and Development: Policy and Practice

## Attendees

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<tr>
<td>Allen Chari</td>
<td>Connections for Development</td>
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<td>Camilla Bowen</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>Caroline Pritchard</td>
<td>Migration Team</td>
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<td>Charlotte Heath</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>Chris Attwood</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
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<td>Chukwu-Emeke Chikezie</td>
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<td>Dawn Li</td>
<td>Global Economy Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>Emma Stone</td>
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<td>Fiona Lawless</td>
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<td>Heaven Crawley</td>
<td>Swansea University</td>
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