Introduction: What Do We Mean by Social Protection?
Social protection is about helping people manage risk. Risk-management can be translated into entrepreneurial behaviour and risk-taking, which potentially leads to investment and growth.

Three main functions of social protection: protective (emergency relief after shocks), preventive (insurance mechanisms), promotive (training and skills recognition), transformative (laws, codes and rights, tackling power issues).

Migration is an important risk-management strategy in itself, but entails particular problems of vulnerability (temporal/spatial remoteness, socio-cultural and socio-political dislocation) and thus requires in turn the need for particular forms of social protection.

Issues for migrants: portability of entitlements; access to social protection at destination and upon return; labour markets.

There is a strong incentive for governments to provide social protection to migrants. Until this is achieved, migrants’ needs will surface as a direct cost, as employers often fail to make the relevant contributions. It should also ensure mobility between jobs, and thus help avoid labour market rigidities and lower efficiency.

Session 1: Portability Regimes and Formal Provisions
Johanna Avato, World Bank
Social protection systems vary widely between lower and higher income countries. It is important to distinguish between the way rights and access regimes affect migrants on the basis of North-North, South-North and South-South flows. The majority of migrants move regionally, South-South, in regions with the world’s worst coordination capacity and provision regarding social protection. Thus the poorest and most vulnerable migrants, particularly the undocumented, are the least likely to access social protection.
Chris Brailey, IBM Global Business Services
There is a need to facilitate international collaboration and coordination on data-gathering, negotiating and establishing portability regimes. Existing negotiations face the challenge of conflicting data systems, so that it can take up to 12 or 13 years to establish a portability regime. With better brokers, regimes would be easier to set up. An independent broker positioned outside existing national structures could improve the gathering of information and help negotiate agreements.

Marius Olivier, University of Johannesburg
SADC migration flows are mainly made up of labour migration movements to Botswana and South Africa. Problems: 1) Shift in determination of poverty dynamics from race to class, combined with large volumes of informal labour migration. 2) In most SADC countries social insurance/social security is linked to identifiable, i.e. formal, employment conditions, and within that to immigration status, which takes precedence over all other rights to protection. These restrictions exclude the vast majority of people. Solutions are likely to be multilateral, incremental, and to reconceptualise residence and employment.

- Transnational migrants are mostly highly qualified individuals and decision-makers – international civil servants and directors of multinational companies. However, some receiving countries, Canada in particular, are seeing this need for portability across a range of skills.

- EU institutions constitute instances of supra-national coordination, including for social protection agreements. A useful example is the EU Court of Justice which acts as a broker of information by offering official interpretations of definitions of national systems. Taking into account the facts that the supra-national system is still slow and error-prone and that international coordination may be beyond current capacities, one way of moving forward might be to focus on the standardisation of concepts and organisational ideas.

- Current policy tends to decouple labour market and trade aspects of globalisation from the social impacts and responsibilities linked to globalisation, but it would actually make good sense to re-couple them to provide a framework which would incorporate developing countries. Such a framework could start operating between a few countries, and develop incrementally by challenging the status quo and to shaming non-participant countries into establishing better systems.

- A paradox in the field of formal social protection provision in relation to migrants arises from the declining quality of social provision in general, and the way the state perceives citizens’ needs, in contrast to the constant or even increasing demand for social protection for migrants. Moreover, in the context of migrants’ non-existent or limited voting rights, the politics of migrant social protection is complicated, whilst political will and motivation are hard to attain.

- A typology of different migrants groups’ access to social protection might also add to the classification of levels of social protection at origin. Such a typology could also look at different baselines of social protection in receiving countries. South-North migrants may be
decreasing their level of social protection by migrating to a wealthier country (Mexico to US for example) but this is difficult to assess. In addition, the initiative of the Mexican government to sell insurance to migrants in the US is an interesting case; it constitutes a double contribution on the part of the migrant, but mitigates the burden of return migrants on the origin-country system.

- Formal systems may not automatically be attractive to migrants. In Ghana for example, many people do not trust formal social security systems because they are coordinated by government institutions. Most migrants prefer to go to hometown associations, which are stronger and migrant-focused. Two issues are at stake here: social values, which need to be incorporated since the notion of solidarity and redistribution is an expression of that; and informal social protection, which is highly prevalent in SADC. The latter however is a mostly function of the failure of the formal system to reach out to the poor.

Issues of trust may stem from the poor governance of schemes rather than government involvement in provision per se. This can be problematic because of the politics of private investment, but a mixture of private and public may be the solution.

- Informal practices such as fostering, which many migrants take advantage of as main risk-management strategies, are already part of the social structure. It is important to look at migrants’ informal strategies to see how these can be incorporated in the wider framework. Many are insurance-based arrangements, which could be incorporated or scaled up into the broader system of social protection.

- More and more countries are incorporating local poverty dynamics into social protection strategies. The industrialised-country idea of giving benefits to an individual does not work in Africa – it clashes with cultural values where extended families operate as social networks, such as where HIV/AIDS has removed a generation, and orphaned children are brought into grandmothers’ care. Southern countries are looking at moving away from an individual-recipient approach toward broader arrangements. Universal insurance arrangements and cash transfers are proving effective as they have positive spill over effects for families and do not separate individuals from their networks.

- Rules regarding irregular migration are an important issue to be looked into, because migrant flows continue even where governments attempt to restrict them. These migrants’ existing strategies call into question the potential coverage of any form of formal, government-provided social protection. It is important to look at the situation on the ground before focusing in too much on official mechanisms. Solutions can be quite simple: Mozambican deportations from South Africa, formally huge in number, were virtually halted recently by a bilateral agreement allowing Mozambicans 30 days visa-free entry into South Africa.

1) How can researchers support the contribution of migrants’ voices to the policy process?
2) What are the potential impacts of portability regimes on labour markets? e.g. setting up a portability scheme within SADC – how will it affect other regimes outside the group of countries?
Session 2: Migrants and Host Welfare Systems

Rayah Feldman, London South Bank University
The exclusion of migrants from NHS service provision started to intensify in 2004. Estimated numbers of undocumented: 430,000 (<0.7% of UK population). Regulations have gradually (since the asylum panic of 1990s) restricted access to healthcare for visitors and in particular the undocumented, and have put the burden of identifying the excludable on NHS. There is immense confusion among migrants and within the NHS regarding who is entitled to treatment beyond emergency care, and who is not, with no official way to resolve these issues.

Claudia Hartmann-Hirsch, CEPS/INSTEAD, Luxembourg
Minimum income is the most problematic both in terms of enforcement and in terms of stigmatising migrants. Minimum wage is a discretionary charity under 1897 law, under the responsibility of local authorities. Today a residence condition has been added. But this has become problematic because it has created an extra obstacle in providing access for the homeless and for returning nationals. Luxembourg is reacting to fears of ‘social tourism’, similar to the issue of ‘health tourism’ feared by the UK government. The analysis shows that most migrants are highly-skilled and are less likely to take up benefits than nationals. Moreover, among non-EU migrants whilst there is a higher rate of eligibility (i.e. poverty) their take-up rate is lower than any other group.

Discussant: These presentations highlight the need to look at the implications of restrictive policies in public health and public awareness of these implications. Policies do not appear to be evidence-based, since practitioners are not seeing that denial of access to healthcare or employment causes migrants to return to their country of origin. The link between return and access to social protection is neither linear nor straightforward.

- Receiving countries may be shooting themselves in the foot with regard to integration policies by alienating second-generation youth in particular by denying access to necessary care and benefits. Governments are trying to carry out conflicting policies: restricting migration in the belief this will facilitate the integration of those who are resident already (by decreasing public hostility to them, which is assumed to be based on perceived high levels of immigration), and restricting new migrants’ access to public services, which raises hostility among immigrants.

- There is a link between voting rights and access to social protection; however, no country in Europe allows immigrants to participate in forming national legislation, nor is there a movement to demand it on the part of migrant organisations.

- A lifecycle approach to social protection is particularly useful when dealing with migrants. Yet most data is not collected in this way. Migrants make most claims on the system in the last years of their lives. However, older migrants from countries where strong social and family networks provide most social protection often choose to return home because they can afford ‘better’ care there and have extended family networks to look after them.

- Authorities have the ability to make provisions more or less flexible without actually legislating. Family reunion is difficult for migrants in richer EU states because they have to
reach an income threshold in order to sponsor family members. The Luxembourg research project looks at practices that allow authorities to circumvent restrictive legislation without going so far as changing the law.

- There is a link between immigration status and healthcare access in most receiving countries, including Asia. Given the contradictions between health and immigration policy and the consequent sense of ineligibility, alternatives are arising to fill the gap. These coping strategies, however, may take away responsibility from the state and social providers. One example is in the field of healthcare in the EU: Medecins du Monde, outreach groups and clinics do seek to help migrants subjected to healthcare restrictions.

Session 3: Policy Frameworks

Sefu Papa Kawaya – IOM Kinshasa
The main issue for migrants seeking return is that of portability of social benefits - it is a key area for DRC government to address. In so doing, the government faces three main challenges: the extent of the informal sector (over 80% of activity) - which is not covered by current provision; the need to expand areas covered by social security; the need to develop measures to facilitate the portability of benefits at a regional level. In the first area, several attempts are being made to ‘structure’ the informal sector. With regard to the third issue-area, DRC INSS (National Institute of Social Security) has established links with one regional-level initiative – CIPRES, which is making progress towards achieving the objective of social security harmonisation amongst CIPRES members (DRC is not yet a member). Additionally, INSS, under the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries - CEPGL, took part in a promising trilateral initiative which was thwarted by the violence in 1991. Overall, DRC has the will to work on the issue, at a regional level in particular, but will need expertise and support from specialist international organisations working in those areas (ILO, ISSA…).

Bilisoni Itaye – University of Zimbabwe
Part of the SADC region’s mission includes deepening integration and cooperation between members, including in the field of equity and empowerment for migrants. But the cultural and social characteristics – the value system - must be taken into account in order to design appropriate and workable policies in the field of social protection.

The principle of ubuntu, aka umunhu – referring to specific notions of responsibility and solidarity, which underpins social relations in most of the SADC region, is of particular relevance in this context. It is irrelevant to craft bilateral arrangements using exclusively Western concepts in negotiations framed by Western-defined power relations (imbalance). Ubuntu provides the best insight into what values should be used to develop agreements on portable social provision in the area.

Another major issue is that of a general lack of information – there is a need to harmonise systems of information production and management. Prevailing misconceptions about what ‘Migration’ and ‘Social Protection’ are both as separate issues, and as a nexus. Once the concepts at hand are better understood, a common framework (value system) for negotiations can be developed to facilitate regionally-relevant policies.
**Samia Kazi-Aoul – ILO MIGSEC**

Several policy options already exist to protect migrants, including C97 + C48, C157 and recommendations 167. ILO promotes these policy frameworks, but also assists with and promotes other initiatives in the area of migration and social protection (bi/multi/unilateral; informal arrangements). Coordination is the main problem in developing functional systems in this area. These coordination issues result primarily from disparities in design, poorly developed implementation structures, limited administrative capacity, but also from a lack of will in some areas. MIGSEC is a new ILO project financed by the German Government for two years. The aim of MIGSEC is to map out national and regional strategies in order to extend social security coverage to migrant workers and their families in Africa. Action to date has sought to assess the feasibility of social security agreements amongst African countries.

**Discussant**: A number of issues from the DRC paper are true for a large number of other African countries: there is limited coverage by social security systems in terms of branches but also in terms of recipients – both in potentially entitled recipients and actual recipients. The data from the DR Congo experience under the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries’ initiative reveal some fundamental issues regarding the lack of trust migrants have in the system and regarding the limitations in terms of users’ rights. Only 1/7th of migrants’ applications were successful, out of a small absolute number, even when the system was in place. Incentives to mobility should also be explored.

With regard to the SADC paper, the role of migration as a process positively impacting on poverty is made very clear. In order to better understand potential impacts, a categorisation of social protection systems according to migrant needs, as opposed to regimes (see Session 1), becomes very useful.

There is a need for a shared understanding, to set ‘terms and conditions’ for negotiations. Defining this shared understanding, or common values, in developing social protection for migrants will be informed by an exploration of informal protection systems.

An underlying question here is whether formal and informal systems of social protection should be integrated? If they were, would this ensure better coverage?

- Growth rates in Africa are at least twice as high as those of the developed economies. Enough money should be generated through growth alone to finance poverty-alleviation and social protection provision. But this surplus generated through growth is not being redistributed to the population as it results from non-labour intensive growth. There is no growth in formal wage employment to create a trickle-down effect. Migration is a response to this situation. Policy makers must recognise that efforts to date to link growth, poverty (aka vulnerability) alleviation and social protection have and will not work under current conditions.

- Integrating informal social protection practices into the formal frameworks was how systems developed in Europe. The evolutionary nature of institutions must be taken into account: if the formal system works, the informal sphere will follow.
• Power brokerage is common but not necessary in developing an institutional framework of social security portability (see Australia - NZ). A regional framework does appear to be the best solution though to force equality in negotiations.

• Understanding the specific cultural values is fundamental to ensuring the appropriateness, and ultimately the take-up, of social protection provision. But it is clear that in many cases these values remain overlooked. In particular, it is unfortunate that the ILO MIGSEC programme is only planned for 2 years: much more time is needed to understand the context before designing policy. In SADC a three-year project modelling social security and portability is taking place.

• RMMRU has done a lot of work on labour migration to the Gulf States and South East Asian countries. In those regions, it is felt that labour migrants have been ‘abandoned’ by states, when considering declining support in relation to significant growth in remittances contributing to the national economies at stake. The issue of portability only acquires relevance once issues relating to initial provision of and access to social protection have been addressed.

• Often the formal and informal fields of social protection are presented as existing in juxtaposition to one another – is that the case in reality? For example, this might not be relevant when looking at the sphere of micro-finance. What is the scope for micro-finance in contributing to social protection for migrants?

• The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries are proposing to revive social protection systems at a regional level; however, the example of the Maghreb suggests that a regional approach might not always be the best. The Maghreb countries, as a regional group, sought to negotiate a common agreement with the US 12 years ago, but this initiative failed. However, each country has since developed a favourable bilateral agreement with the US, independently.

• Why do Southern countries automatically seek to emulate Northern country arrangements? It might well be that developing models on the basis of the informal systems in place works much better.

• The main problem in most of Africa is not about governments signing up to policy, but about the implementation and operationalisation of policy agreements. For example, most of the tenets of the ILO convention on migrant workers have even been integrated into national legislation in the case of DR Congo, but nothing has happened in practice.

With regard to growth in Africa, the World Bank has identified a new category of countries, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), and has carried out a study about the sustainability of their economies. The findings show that out of 44 HIPCs, only 4 of them are economically viable/sustainable – a very worrying state of affairs.

• The IMF/WB have a conventional way of looking at these issues. The Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 90s have on the one hand contributed to the economic
conditions which have prompted the migration flows in the SADC region for the past 10 years at least. On the other hand, these two institutions are not yet really looking at migration as a springboard out of poverty. Their conventional approach might not be the best to tackle migration/social protection needs in SADC. Malawi has decided to develop its own strategy with regard to social protection through food provision, which has led to increased growth and a new export capacity.

Session 4: Conceptualising Access

Ian MacAuslan – Conceptualising Access
Social protection vs. social security. SS is for formally employed workers only. 90% of Indian workers are in the informal economy. Three categories of migrant disadvantage can be identified: social-environmental, socio-political, and socio-cultural, each of which operate along several dimensions. A variety of modes of service access exist in poor countries, all of which give rise to more complicated rules and more demands for proof of eligibility. Complexity of the system creates knowledge problems among the poor, and makes exit the only protest for many, albeit a counter-effective one. ‘Universal coverage’ does not mean universal access. It is important to look at technical difficulties the poor encounter in claiming benefits as much as their legal right/entitlement to them.

Melissa Siegel – Immigration and social protection in the Netherlands
Since WWII, the Dutch government has slowly moved toward restricting access to social protection for immigrants – increased numbers of asylum-seekers (the largest flow of migrants) since the 1990s has led to new legal provisions around entitlements. Asylum-seeker numbers have decreased over 2000s, but still form a significant proportion of the claimants of welfare benefits. For non-permanent residents, there is a conflict where access is based on residency, but keeping residency is predicated on not claiming any kind of benefit. The ‘Linkage act’ has made it possible for government to exclude migrants from social protection. Dedicated health services, established in the 1970s for refugees and later asylum-seekers, have now been restricted. Today, it is estimated that 129,000 undocumented migrants have no social benefits. Most restrictions to social protection provision have occurred since 1990 and affecting migrants most negatively.

Mythri Prasad – Formality and informality in Indian social protection
The traditional dichotomy of formal and informal, with regard to social protection strategies is problematic. Formality is characterised as ordered and functional, and informality as chaotic and dysfunctional. However, the majority of workers are informal as are the majority of strategies. Formal trade unions representing informal workers make claims on their behalf, which blurs the boundaries between existing categories. There is a flow between informal and formal types of social protection. The messiness of such negotiations may necessitate new terminology and new ways of looking at these processes. Some sectors, e.g. construction, depend on worker mobility, but this is not recognised by social protection mechanisms. Formalisation may restrict worker mobility by restricting them to one employer, and is thus sometimes resisted by workers. Conflicting territories of formal/informal, state/worker are where these issues play out.
Discussant: Migrants have immense problems making any claims to public provision. Migration in itself has aspects which makes access problematic. Rules are either excessively bureaucratic or are not designed to give migrants access, sometimes because this may be too costly an input for the state. Social capital is an important factor in gaining access – ways of applying, ways of representing oneself as deserving and entitled. Stigmatisation is another factor – there is often an overlap between ethnicity or caste, poverty, and migration. Can we disentangle the position of migrants with relation to this minefield? Migrants may even have more access to provision than non-migrants among the poor because they develop access in the non-public market sphere.

- The most important factors of exclusion relating to migration are legal obstacles, i.e. the legal framework at various levels. This is linked to administrative practices, which are hard to analyse because information on authorities’ scope of interpretation is lacking. Some governments have changed laws to restrict migrants’ access, while others have done so just by changing administrative practices. In the Netherlands, administrative practices have been as important as legal reforms in restricting the access of migrants to social protection.

- It is important to ground the discourse on migrant social protection in local geographies of power. The livelihoods approach may conflict with conventional conceptualisations of access to social protection – as a process of negotiation rather than as being dichotomised. It is important to look at how migrants themselves perceive these problems and their solutions. Migrants’ solutions are not static – they respond to circumstances. When a Ghanaian man migrates, he makes sure his salary is not stopped and goes to his family at home. He remains in contact with his family, preserving mutual bonds of social protection and care.

- How can migrants be incorporated into the political system? Is there a network that political parties can use, that is formalisable, among existing solutions migrants are using to social protection access/entitlement problems? Migrant groups may differ in their desire to participate politically – the highly skilled may not be there for long, for instance. Political negotiation and contestation is an important part of the picture. However, being a migrant can be a question of degree, so that it is hard to draw distinctions between migrants and non-migrants. It is difficult to say whether it is a useful exercise to make these distinctions too narrowly. Moreover, migrants may not be interested in political participation at point of destination: they may have another point of access politically at their place of origin, and may only be interested in participating economically.

- Agency and political action have not been a major focus so far. To what extent are regulations imposed on migrants and what are the avenues for organising by migrants? How should we distinguish between different types of migrants? Politicians may not have incentives to organise migrants, there might be a language barrier between politicians and migrants. In particular, citizenship may be only technical for internal migrants: in practice they may not be able to access any of the benefits of citizenship.
Session 5: Overcoming Constraints at Destination

Rachel Sabates-Wheeler
This paper uses data on Malawian migrants to South Africa and the UK to investigate the interaction between legal status, migration outcomes and social protection, focusing in particular on informal social protection strategies. It uses qualitative data to demonstrate that there is a selection effect on migrants to different destinations; that illegality does not act as a negative factor in migrant outcomes; and that length of stay and access to informal social protection (through migrants’ own social networks) are the most important factors in positive outcomes.

Vasilis Lolis
Based on research into Ukrainian and Albanian migrant domestic workers in Greece, this paper draws attention to new forms of welfare marginalisation for these women, looks into how these come about and what informal strategies are devised to circumvent failure of access to formal social protection. It employs two methodologies: interviews with key informants and life-stories.

Stephanie Barrientos
An assessment of the comparative risks and vulnerabilities faced by migrant workers in the pineapple export sector in Ghana helps inform how social protection can be effectively adapted for migrant labour. ‘Primary’, or first-generation migrants, are shown to have higher skill levels and more secure, permanent jobs accessed through social networks, but no access to land given that they have moved recently. ‘Secondary’, or ‘second generation’, migrants have more precarious jobs and less claim to social protection. The research shows how economic shocks are now becoming concentrated due to global value chains, and lead to different outcomes for the two types of migrant.

Discussant: Different patterns of migration are highlighted – history and past migration patterns are fundamentally important in determining types of networks. Malawians tried to create associations in the UK and have not been able to. This is partly to do with insecurity, the past regime leading to a lack of trust and ethnic cleavages being reproduced at destination. But this is not true of Malawians in South Africa. It may hold true for those with a certain level of education, but not for others. Having a foothold allows migrants in South Africa to access more forms of social protection. In the UK, particularly among Ghanaians, informal networks – friends and associations – allow migrants to access healthcare, children’s education etc outside formal channels.

- Researchers of the Ghana study were surprised by the emergence of a distinction between primary and secondary migrants. Primary migrants came from poorer Eastern/Volta region, towards the agricultural region outside Accra, and were therefore moving up economically by migrating. The secondary migrants, however, were starting out from the area around Accra, and were on their way into Accra itself, and were less focused on getting permanent jobs. This partly explains their differing access to social protection mechanisms.

Primary vs. secondary migrants: employers may be requesting migrants by region because these determine skills and social factors; the presence of family locally might influence the way they work. It has been hard for Ghanaians abroad to form strong networks because of political divisions in Ghana. Ghanaians have also not had voting rights from abroad until
recently, which has also had an influence on networks. Which ethnic group is in power influences the networks in receiving country – Ghanaians only became able to form networks in UK once politics at home changed.

- Social networks in the UK: a large Malawian community in Aberdeen decided to set up an association. It is now linked to the office of the President/Cabinet in Malawi and looking at possible projects in rural Malawi. The association has also formed a company in Malawi to act as investment window, and identify shares on the Malawian stock exchange that constitute good investments, provide people with collateral for loans etc. The Minister of Economic Planning and Development has now developed the first national social protection policy as a result of the research carried out. Information has been disseminated to government offices, and the Government is thinking about IOM membership. There is a need to develop these activities further and look at remittances to see what contribution they have made.

**Session 6**

**Paolo Boccagni: Ecuadorean migrants’ social protection in Spain**

Ecuadorean government conceives of its emigrant population as ‘quinta seccion’, the fifth region of the country - overseas. (The Mexican government does same). It has started to frame migration as a positive strategy and as contributing to the home country. The government is thereby seeking to increase the involvement of migrants in domestic politics, and understands the provision of social protection for expatriates to be the duty of the state. Ecuador’s constitution guarantees social protection to its migrants overseas. However, this does not translate into actual provision of social protection for migrants. Actual measures include: de-stigmatising migration, cultivating transnational ties, stimulating remittances/investments, promoting migrants’ advocacy overseas, providing social/legal support in receiving countries. Key issues to be addressed remain in the spheres of household remittances, collective remittances and transnational care-giving. So far, social protection from above for migrants remains minimal in comparison to social protection initiatives from below, with weak links between the two.

**Sofiane Bouhdiba: pensions for returnees in Maghreb**

Retirement is the principal reason (14%) for return. The main problem lies in the field of healthcare: the public health system is inadequate but the private system is good, if one can afford it. Thus the decision to return for retirees involves accepting that they will spend a certain portion of their EU pension on healthcare. Some return regularly (every 6 months) to the destination country in order to keep their documents current, and thereby access healthcare when they need to. A high wage differential combined with a favourable exchange rate means a retiree’s pension from Germany is equivalent to the wage of a private sector manager. The main dilemma resides in the following question: return to country of origin and live well, or stay at destination and receive social protection? Data shows that migrants are most likely to invest upon return when they have spent less than 10 years away, and are much less likely to after 30 years away. The window for investment is a few years longer in Tunisia.

**Delali Margaret Badasu: Wellbeing of children left behind in Ghana by fathers’ migration**
The proportion of immigrants to total population in Ghana declined after 1969, but rose again recently (Aryeetey-Attoh, 2005). The data on migration however is largely unreliable; besides, Ghana has no migration policy. Discussions have focused on remittances, which at one point was said to constitute the 3rd most important contributor to GDP, but this is also unreliable. Ghana’s child protection services are unable to deal with families where one parent is an international migrant. The study is based on internal (Ewe) migrants in Accra. Strong beliefs remain around fatherhood and related identity, and strong stigma are still attached to childlessness. Only 33% of children in the study received support from their fathers. The main factors in child wellbeing are: the socioeconomic status of mothers, the ability to access official support from the Office of violence in families (DOVVSU). Where international migrants father children, there can be a conflict between the law in receiving and sending country: a second marriage is permitted in Ghana where a child is born, but not in the EU – as a result the mother is left unaided in the home country. Moreover the stigma of single motherhood in villages can be significant, and even endanger the mother.

**Discussant:** There is a conflict between public interventions and private initiatives. Where is the interface between the top-down and the bottom-up? Migrants constitute an economic benefit for sending countries, and retirees come back significantly richer than their compatriots, however, to what extent are two-tier systems (particularly in the health sector) involving returnees a problem? There is a vacuum regarding public intervention, a need for states to come in and play a greater role, but states often lack the capacity/resources. Where it is appropriate for the state to intervene but it does not (e.g. Ghana child support agency), there is no way for private interventions to fill the gap.

- Maghreb countries are aiming to start activities with returnees who are over 65, while industrialised countries tend to discount retirees. Today’s migrants leave as potential social protection claimants but return as contributors and as potential investors – an opportunity for the state. Policy is starting to recognise that even temporary return can have strong positive effects on sending countries.

- In Ghana, there is a social stigma attached to men being brought to account by state institutions for child support – women often fail to apply for protection because their parents stop them from embarrassing a man publicly.

**Final Comments:**

- Of serious concern is the fact that social security in the developing world through its limited coverage contributes to social differentiation. Social security is often seen as serving the interests of the working elite (i.e. in the formal economy), and not reaching out to those most in need of coverage. As indicated before, social security systems in Africa by and large restrict their coverage to those who work in the formal sector. However, it is clear that the general picture in Africa is one of prevailing and growing informal sector and unemployment, while the formal sector is constitutes a very small and shrinking share of activity.
• Laying all focus on reforming that section of the social security system which covers only a minor share of the labour force, at the expense of the informal sector and those who are unemployed, is inherently unequal, as it directs the attention of government and other stakeholders away from a huge segment of the population with no or little social security coverage. There is, therefore, a need to investigate ways, means and modalities of extending coverage to these excluded categories.

• Therefore, innovative approaches are required, including:
  - Extending, where appropriate social insurance mechanisms;
  - Forms of direct universal and targeted State support;
  - Providing savings- and insurance-based arrangements aimed at the informal economy; and
  - State-recognised, -enabled, and to some extent State-regulated mutuality-based frameworks

• Fluidity and continuity characterise formal and informal economy involvement, as well as public and non-public measures aimed at social security provisioning. No single measure is sufficient in itself. The evolutionary nature of the ‘pure’ private and community-based survival mechanisms must be clearly understood, in view of what was said above.

Themes:
• Welfare systems: myths about how migrants manipulate systems.

• Coordination, transparency and trust

• Conceptualising access – to what extent do these concepts relate to each other?

• Special and collective risks – relevant in migration context. Social security designed to address poverty profiles and involves numerous and often complementary mechanisms that can be both formal and informal. ECOSOC document is the first to recognise interaction of formal and non-formal mechanisms.

• Forms of social protection for migrants tend not to take care of classic risks – maternity, disease and disability, unemployment, old age. Migrants are usually not interested in these risks while migrating, but need protection nevertheless. State role: formal framework for SS and social protection (see Marius’ comments for more).

• Assumptions and entitlements re: welfare varies by geography and context. To what extent do we need to differentiate between different types of migrants, and between migrants and non-migrant poor? May sometimes be useful to see migrants as part of larger group of poor, and sometimes to distinguish their particular challenges/solutions.

• Restrictions: on access/eligibility reflect local concerns but are surprisingly similar. Benefit tourism, integration, identification. Restrictions on migrants’ access are being tightened everywhere. Reminds us that the politics of identifying the poor/vulnerable/excluded and
providing transfers is highly sensitive – all social protection is politically sensitive for someone.

- Unit of analysis: individual, household, social network, units may operate differently depending on location. Migration turns people into individuals when they may not be acting that way.

- Formality/informality: majority of presentations deal with various forms of informality because most migrants worldwide are engaged in informal social protection activities. Also about contribution vs. access disjuncture: Migrants may be contributing to one system and accessing a completely different one, they move proactively and fluidly across boundaries of formal/informal systems.

- Conflicting systems: Some sectors may make internal worker mobility obligatory (e.g. construction), but often do not involve formal relations of employment: conflict between work and social protection eligibility. Universality vs. specificity: 'universal' systems may lead inevitably to migrant exclusion – are migrants better off with targeted schemes run by NGOs/other migrants, despite receiving less? Difficulties of states in providing social protection to migrants – even if they wanted to do so adequately, they might not have the resources/knowledge. What is the process by which they can engage?

- Preferences: people do make choices about the types of social protection they access and where, which can be proactive as well as responsive. Needs and offerings may not match up in important ways due to cultural issues. Burial needs, for example, are not going to be taken into account by receiving country social protection regimes. There are also cases where policy must go against cultural beliefs and prejudices in order to provide protection for the vulnerable. What is the role of the state in upholding potentially conflicting rights, particularly where children are concerned? Must be taken into account in thinking about instituting/changing systems.