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Migration and Pro-Poor Policy in Africa

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB	African Development Bank
CEAC	Economic Community of Central African States
CEPGL	Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
GLSS	Ghana Living Standards Survey
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMP	International Migration Policy Programme
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPEC	International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
ISSER	Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (Ghana)
MFIs	Micro-Finance Institutions
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
MTOs	Money Transfer Organisations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RGDN	Rwanda Global Disapora Network
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USDOS	United States Department of State

1 INTRODUCTION

Migration has been an integral part of labour markets and livelihoods across much of the African continent for at least the last century. Over time, and in different places, it has taken a number of different forms. It has included internal, regional and international movements. It has cut across class and skill boundaries, and exists in widely different demographic contexts. Migration represents an important livelihood strategy for poor households seeking to diversify their sources of income, but is also characteristic of the better off, and indeed of many African elites.

This paper reports on the findings of a survey conducted by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research on migration and pro-poor policy in Africa. The survey covered existing literature, and discussions with DFID country offices across the continent, and was conducted in early 2004. The paper is complemented by three separate papers, on West, East and Southern Africa, which are published separately by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, and together by the Department for International Development.

2 DATA ISSUES

There are conflicting accounts of the volume of migration in contemporary Africa, reflecting the paucity of data sources and their often poor quality. According to the African Union, of the 150 million international migrants in the world, one third are estimated to be Africans.¹ In contrast, the ILO estimates that 20 million African men and women are migrant workers (ILOb 2003); IOM figures suggest that out of 175 million migrants worldwide, just 16.2 million are *in* Africa (IOM 2003), whilst Zlotnik highlights only Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa as key countries of immigration on the continent (Zlotnik 1998). Elsewhere, the size of foreign populations is either very small, or, in the absence of statistical systems to monitor flows, numbers are largely unknown. These figures do not include the large amount of undocumented cross-border migration within Africa, nor the extent of migration within countries (Adepoju 1994).

Table 1: Migrants as a Proportion of the Population

Region	% migrants
Caribbean	2.9%
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.8%
Latin America	1.7%
Asia	1.4%

Source: Zlotnik (1998)

¹ See <http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm>

2.1 Refugees and IDPs

One area in which Africa has long been prominent is in the production of refugees, where it accounts for a third or more of global totals. However, the numbers have been in steady decline since a peak of 6.8 million in 1995 – the number has since fallen to 4.6 million at the start of 2003, largely as a result of significant repatriation to Rwanda from 1996. The main refugee-producing countries in Africa now are Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, although significant repatriations have also occurred to all of these, with the exception of Sudan.² There is growing awareness of the extent of internal displacement in Africa, with an estimated 13 million IDPs dwarfing the number of refugees, and representing over half of the global total of IDPs.³ These include an estimated 3 million in Sudan and 1.2 million in Uganda. Although there were some repatriations in 2003, new IDPs were created in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Sudan, Liberia, and in the Central African Republic.

2.2 International Migration

There is substantial and growing migration from key African countries to Europe and North America.⁴ Data presented in Appendix 1 shows that, from Africa as a whole, over 110,000 people left each year to go to Europe or the US between 1995-2001, with the number rising from 93,000

Table 2: African-Born Residents in the US, 2000

Country of birth	Number
Nigeria	134,940
Ethiopia	69,531
Ghana	65,572
South Africa	63,558
Sierra Leone	20,831

Source: US Census, 2000, cited at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Usfocus/print.cfm?ID=147>

in 1995 to nearly 140,000 in 2001. Countries with higher than average annual rates of migration proportional to their population size were Somalia and Eritrea in East Africa; Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Gambia and Guinea Bissau in West Africa; and South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Comoros in Southern Africa.

In terms of absolute numbers, the key countries of long-distance emigration were Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia and Senegal. Of these, migration from South Africa,

² The major hosting nations in Africa are Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Congo, Zambia and Guinea. See UNHCR, 2003, Populations of concern to UNHCR, www.unhcr.ch

³ See Global IDP project website, http://www.idproject.org/regions/Africa_idps.htm

⁴ There is also substantial migration to the Gulf, although accurate data on this is unavailable.

Somalia and Senegal is oriented primarily to Europe, Ethiopian emigration is oriented primarily to the US, and Nigerian and Ghanaian emigration is split evenly between the two.

2.3 Internal Migration

There is rather less available data on flows of migrants within African countries, though evidence from micro-level studies suggests that this form of mobility is very substantial across most African countries. Relevant data may be available from censuses, although recent censuses in some countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania and Malawi do not include information on internal migration. Thirteen African countries have not held a census within the last ten years; many others have held them so recently that preliminary results are not yet available (Appendix 2).

Special surveys that include figures on internal migration are available in some countries. Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) in Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania and Côte d'Ivoire⁵ provide fairly reliable measures of household livelihoods as well as basic migration data.

2.4 Demographics of Migrants

On the basis of currently available data, it is not possible to generalise much about the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of internal and inter-regional migration within Africa, apart from noting that it involves men, women and children⁶. There is some evidence that the number of young female migrants has increased from countries such as Nigeria, Mali and Tanzania (Tacoli 2002: 20). Predominant flows appear to be from rural to urban areas, although rural-rural migration is also significant in many countries, with areas of significant cash-crop production often recruiting large numbers of farm labourers from neighbouring regions. Only eight African countries have more than half of their population in towns (ILOa 2003: 11).

There is increasing evidence of links between migration and HIV/AIDS, although this tends to focus more on high HIV prevalence amongst migrants, rather than investigation of how the

⁵ LSMS are available in Ghana for 1985, 1987, 1988, 1991 and 1998, for Tanzania in 1991 (Kagera region only) and 1993, South Africa for 1993, and Côte d'Ivoire annually for 1985-88. See <http://www.worldbank.org/lsm/>

⁶ According to the [World Migration 2003](#), half of Africa's migrants are women.

contraction of HIV/AIDS affects migration patterns and the value of migration as a livelihood strategy. Meanwhile, patterns of internal migration appear to have been affected by economic crisis and structural adjustment, with some arguing that a long trend of urbanisation across the continent has been stopped or even reversed (Potts 1995). However, much of the evidence for both urbanisation and counter-urbanisation remains anecdotal.

In contrast, slightly more confident observations can be made on African migration to Europe and North America. which seems to be dominated by flows of more educated, and by implication less poor individuals (see Table 3). This evidence is provided by the US Census and the SOPEMI reporting system on migration statistics for OECD countries. Based on 1990 census figures, it has been calculated that 95,000 out of 128,000 African migrants in the US at that time had a tertiary education, whilst migration of those with primary education or below was 'virtually zero' (Carrington and Detragiache 1999).

Nonetheless, it appears that only a relatively small proportion of individuals with tertiary education migrated to the US from African countries. The figure was over 5 per cent for Mozambique, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe, over 10 per cent for Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, around 25 per cent for Sierra Leone and a massive 60 per cent for Gambia (Carrington and Detragiache 1999). When migration to other OECD countries is added, it was estimated that over a quarter of Ghanaians with tertiary education had left Ghana, whilst the figure for South Africa was around 8 per cent.

Table 3: Educational Attainment of African-born Population in the US, 2000

Country of birth	Proportion with 4 years schooling or less	Proportion with over 4 years tertiary education
Nigeria	7%	47%
Tanzania	4%	46%
Cameroon	6%	45%
Uganda	3%	45%
South Africa	8%	44%
Zimbabwe	6%	39%
Kenya	10%	36%
Africa total¹	8%	33%
Sudan	15%	28%
Africa, ns/nec	8%	28%
Ghana	7%	26%
Senegal	9%	25%
Liberia	8%	25%
Ethiopia	8%	23%
Sierra Leone	9%	23%
Eritrea	10%	18%
US total²	18%	16%
Somalia	24%	9%

Source: Calculated from 5% sample of US census

Notes: 1. Figure for all residents born in Africa; 2. Figure for all residents born in US, for comparison

3 THE PLACE OF MIGRATION IN PUBLIC POLICY

Across sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the position of governments towards migration generally remains either neutral or hostile. In a review by UNDESA (2002), seven countries – Kenya, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Botswana, Namibia, Djibouti, and Gambia – were reported as indicating in 2000 that levels of immigration were too high, whilst a further eleven reported that they had in place policies to reduce immigration. Meanwhile, four – Gabon, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Bissau – reported that emigration was too high, and that their policy was to reduce emigration. In its most recent review of the status of poverty in Africa, the African Development Bank refers to rural-urban migration as a source of urban poverty. However, a recent position paper of the ILO, 'Working Out of Poverty', fails to mention migration as a relevant component of poverty or poverty reduction. In the UNDESA survey, only one country – Cape Verde – considered that its level of emigration was too low, and even then, there was no explicit government policy to promote it.

3.1 Brain Drain

One area in which concern is expressed about migration is the 'brain drain' of African professionals. This is said to hit the sectors of health, education and technological development particularly severely (IOM 2003: 223). As African professionals leave the continent, an estimated US\$4 billion is spent each year, mostly through overseas aid programmes, on hiring some 100,000 skilled expatriates to replace them (IOM 2003).⁷

A number of policy responses have been put forward to address this 'brain drain'. At one level, intergovernmental initiatives, including through the African Union, have sought to improve the quality of tertiary education in Africa, and facilitate the circulation of students and professionals within Africa, to pre-empt the necessity for Africans to go abroad for university training (Essy 2004). The African Virtual University, established by the World Bank in 1997, operates in 17 African countries and has so far educated more than 24,000 students.

Where training does take place abroad, there are various mechanisms that might be put in place to encourage individuals to return. One positive example is provided by analysis of return amongst participants in AIDS training and research programmes funded by the Fogarty International Center and National Institutes of Health in the US. Nearly 80 per cent of African trainees returned after acquiring masters, doctoral or post-doctoral training. The strategies used in this case included the building of health infrastructure in the trainee's home country, provision of re-entry research support and the use of short-stay visas and repayment agreements to discourage continued stay (Kupfer, Jarawan, et al. 2002).

3.2 Links with the Diaspora

Another response at continent-wide level has been the development of links with Africans abroad, either to encourage them to return, or to utilise their skills, knowledge or financial capital in the promotion of African development. Online databases, which provide an opportunity for Africans abroad to advertise their skills, or for African companies or government bodies to advertise vacancies, have been advocated or established by organisations such as

⁷ It might be questioned whether these skilled expatriates are technically 'replacing' Africans who move abroad, or whether their employment reflects the broader structure of overseas aid that emphasises management by 'international' staff and the need for 'technical cooperation'.

'Africa's Brain Gain' (ABG)⁸, Africa Recruit⁹ and the Economic Commission for Africa (Chikezie 2001). There are also initiatives focused on specific sectors such as health¹⁰ and law¹¹, as well as databases of diaspora members maintained by particular countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, Benin, and Burkina Faso.

The International Organisation for Migration has also established a 'Migration for Development in Africa' (MIDA) programme, which aims to build partnerships between host countries and countries of origin of migrants, and encourage the return of African professionals on temporary assignments.¹² In addition, some countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Rwanda and Ethiopia, have organised meetings and conferences for members of the diaspora, whilst the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) of the African Union organised the first 'AU-Western Hemisphere Diaspora Forum' in Washington DC in December 2002.¹³

3.3 African Union Policy

At a continent-wide level, the African Union has established a 'strategic framework for a policy on migration' (African Union 2004), and a specific programme on migration within its Social Affairs Directorate. The programme's goals include addressing the causes of internal and international migration and the 'challenges posed by migration'. It also seeks cooperation between countries to 'make effective use of the opportunity presented by the phenomenon', and seeks to assist AU member states to work towards the free movement of people.¹⁴ At the moment, this programme appears to exist on paper only; in contrast, the strategic framework is to be pushed forward at an experts meeting in Addis Ababa in March 2004, with assistance from IOM.

⁸ See www.africasbraingain.org

⁹ See www.africarecruit.com

¹⁰ See http://www.iom.int/MIDA/mida_health.shtml

¹¹ The African Law Institute plans to establish a web-based African Legal Skills Bank. See <http://www.africalawinstitute.org/talent.html>

¹² The MIDA programme partially replaces the Return of Qualified African Nations (RQAN) programme, which facilitated the return of just over 2,500 professionals between 1983-99. On-going MIDA programmes focus on the Great Lakes, Somalia, Ghana and Guinea

¹³ See www.africa-union.org

¹⁴ Resolution (regulation) on establishment of a strategic framework for a policy of migration in Africa, CM/Dec.34 (LXXIV), at www.africa-union.org/.

3.4 Migration and the Health Sector

Concern with the effects of migration has also filtered through into policy-making in specific sectors. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) has not yet developed an overall policy or initiative on migration, but its proposed strategy for the health sector does include measures to mitigate the loss of health sector personnel, including the promotion of guidelines on ethical recruitment practices, and measures to improve conditions of service and work environments.¹⁵ Attention also certainly needs to be paid to the factors creating shortages of doctors and nurses in recruiting countries, although this is clearly much more difficult for NEPAD or the AU to influence.

It is worth noting here that the impact of migration on health outcomes for poor people is felt not only through migration of health personnel to northern countries, but also through regional migration flows (e.g. to South Africa, Namibia and elsewhere), rural-urban migration within countries, and through 'migration' from the public to the private sector.¹⁶ In this context, measures to promote improved telecommunications or the supply of drugs to rural clinics may have an impact in reducing movement of health personnel out of clinics serving the poorest. Expansion of training in the health sector in general – both in Africa and in the 'north' – also clearly needs to be part of the solution.

¹⁵ See <http://www.africalawinstitute.org/talent.html>

¹⁶ Interview with Eric Buch, NEPAD Special Advisor on Health, 18/02/2004

Box 1: Migration in the PRSPs

A review of PRSPs across Africa shows considerable ambivalence about migration -- it is often either not recognised as an issue, or not addressed. So, for example, in a total of seven sub-Saharan African PRSPs, migration is not mentioned at all, whilst in a further ten other countries, it is mentioned, but the anti-poverty strategies outlined in the document fail to then refer to it as an issue. In Burundi, the DRC and Sierra Leone, forced migration is considered, but other forms of migration are not.

Overwhelmingly, where economic migration is mentioned, it is seen as negative. For example, migration is seen as contributing to population growth (Gambia), placing pressure on urban areas (Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania), breaking down traditional family structures (Kenya, Malawi), promoting the spread of crime (Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Sierra Leone) and diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Burkina Faso, Niger, Sierra Leone), stimulating land degradation (Ethiopia) and reinforcing rural poverty (Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone). Only Cape Verde and Senegal mention emigration as a positive factor, with the Cape Verde PRSP noting that restrictive measures in host countries have cut remittances, whilst the Niger and Rwanda PRSPs note that internal migration can boost household incomes of the poor.

Where policy responses to migration are mentioned, these are primarily geared to reducing or preventing migration, mainly through promoting rural development. However, some exceptions exist. For example, both Cape Verde and Senegal propose a strategy to promote remittances and engage emigrants in national development, whilst Mauritania suggests creating viable jobs in urban areas rather than trying to prevent rural-urban migration.

Source: Review of PRSPs, March 2004. See Appendix 3.

The migration of health personnel in Africa has also received the attention of the World Health Organisation, which conducted a study of over 2,000 health professionals across Ghana, Uganda, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Senegal in 2002 (WHO 2003). This study found that availability of training, standard of living and working conditions were all significant factors encouraging health personnel to emigrate, and that their loss is having a significant impact in terms of increasing workload. This decreases motivation and quality of service provided by those who remain, who are often less skilled and unqualified to carry out specialist tasks.

There is also concern in some quarters that rich nations should pay some sort of compensation for medical personnel recruited out of Africa, given the structure of African health sector training in which the bulk of this training is publicly funded and provided. However, the Joint Learning Initiative on Human Resources for Health (HRH), funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, has stressed that whilst health systems are suffering attrition from international migration and internal displacement, they also face significant challenges from deteriorating conditions of employment, reduced effectiveness of delivery systems, an increase in disease burdens and a lack of financing for the sector from African governments.

A recent study of the movement of doctors and nurses from Ghana, Zimbabwe and South Africa to the UK critiques emerging WHO policy in this area (Stilwell, Diallo et al. 2003). It stresses that data are poor, and might be better collected in destination countries. It also suggests that migration of medical personnel from Africa to the UK at least may be declining, whilst movement of nurses has recently increased dramatically.

3.5 Migration and Livelihoods

In contrast to this attention to the brain drain, there appears to be rather less interest amongst African governments in migration as a livelihood strategy, or in the welfare of migrants, despite the fact that this relates more clearly to the poor and to pro-poor policy. Rather, traditional countries of immigration such as South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon have become more intolerant of migrant workers. Regional blocks such as ECOWAS and SADC have generally failed to prioritise freedom of movement. Where attention has been paid to HIV/AIDS, this has tended to stigmatise migrants as potentially spreading the epidemic (Parker and Aggleton 2002).¹⁷ There has also been little attention given to date to policies on currency exchange or the improvement and extension of banking systems in a way that would facilitate the flow of remittances.

In the field of forced migration in particular, there has been a tightening of policies towards refugees in a number of countries, reflecting growing global antipathy towards forced migrants (Handmaker et al. 2001). States have cited the economic burdens involved, declining support from international donors, and potential security threats (e.g. camps being used as rebel bases, local insecurity and cross-border attacks). In addition to some cases of expulsion of refugees, a major consequence appears to have been the increased use of camps with severe restrictions on movement, even though these have often failed to guarantee security and limit refugees' ability to contribute to their own livelihoods and the local economy.

Nonetheless, 11 countries¹⁸ are signatories to the Migrant Workers Convention – more than in most other regions of the world. The ILO has designed and launched an 'African Labour Migration Policy Initiative' which seeks to enhance the knowledge base on labour migration and build capacity of labour ministries and others to deal with labour migration (ILOa 2003: 41). IOM has conducted some preliminary work to identify and promote networking between initiatives to combat HIV/AIDS amongst migrant and mobile populations (Cowan-Louw et al. 2002). Some sectoral organisations have also promoted mobility, e.g. the Association of

¹⁷ A number of countries worldwide have sought to restrict the entry of migrants with (or suspected of having) HIV/AIDS, whilst some countries have sought to deport migrant sex workers through fear of the epidemic spreading.

¹⁸ Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda

African Universities has called on African governments to bring in legislation to promote the mobility of academic staff and students.¹⁹

4 KEY ISSUES FOR PRO-POOR POLICY

Clearly for many African governments and international organisations, most attention to migration has been focused on the movement of mainly skilled professionals to the US and Europe, and measures that might be taken to limit this flow, and/or reach out to such migrants and encourage their return or their engagement with development initiatives in their home countries. However, although such linkages may be relevant to pro-poor policy, it is important to bear in mind that they may not: e.g. the private

capital transfers of such migrants may not filter down to sectors of the economy where the poor are found, whilst the return of professionals may have little impact on services targeted at the poor.

In contrast, it is important not to ignore large-scale migration by the poor in search of livelihood, even if this has, to date, received less attention from governments and policy-makers. A review of Africa-wide issues based on field studies in Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania conducted by IIED notes that occupational diversification in rural areas is often inextricably linked to mobility, whilst 'migration has been a key factor in shaping Africa's settlement patterns and households' livelihoods' (Tacoli 2002: 19). This study found that a staggering 50-80 per cent of rural households had at least one migrant member, across all wealth categories, and with increasing involvement of women as independent migrants (see Box 2).

Box 2: *Migration and Poverty: Trends in the 1990s*
In work by IIED, strong linkages maintained between (rural) source and (urban) destination areas for migrants in Africa were found to:

- promote significant flows of remittances
 - encourage community level initiatives for the construction of public facilities and infrastructure,
 - help to link rural producers to urban markets.
- However, the study also found that remittances had declined over a 15-year period, largely as a result of employment insecurity in destination areas, even though at the same time rural households had become more dependent on these remittances. In turn, public policy had failed to recognise the spatial and occupational complexity of rural and urban livelihoods.

Source: Tacoli (2002)

¹⁹ 'Give students, academics free movement in Africa', *Social News*, <http://www.ghana.co.uk/news/content.asp?articleID=9351>, posted 24 July 2003.

4.1 Remittances

The potential for remittances to contribute to national development priorities, including the reduction of poverty, is clearly a priority for policy-makers across the continent. However, it is worth noting – in contrast to comments globally that remittances constitute a ‘stable source of external development finance’ (Ratha 2003: 157) – that remittances in Africa appear highly volatile, at least in terms of official IMF figures. The standard deviation from annual average remittance figures between 1980 and 1999 was over 50 per cent in the cases of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Niger and Togo, and over 100 per cent in Botswana, Lesotho and Nigeria. In Burkina Faso, official remittances dropped from \$187 million in 1988 to just \$67 million in 1999, a decrease of two thirds, which also coincided with a sharp drop in GDP growth rates (IOM 2003: 230).

If official figures are to be believed, international remittances are much smaller in Africa than in any other world region, representing just 10 per cent of external finance in 2001, compared to 63 per cent in South Asia, and 56 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa (Kapur 2003: 6). In part, this is because almost two-thirds of sub-Saharan African countries simply do not report any data on remittances (Sander 2003: 15), suggesting that investment in monitoring systems would be of some value.

4.2 Forced Migration

There is also scope for the development of more coordinated regional policies on forced migration, given the prominence of forced migration across the continent. Although most African countries are signatories to the 1969 OAU Convention²⁰, and many in practice recognise refugees *en masse*, or devolve responsibility to UNHCR for the processing of refugee claims, there have been calls for a change of approach from some quarters (e.g. the mixed assistance and protection mandate of UNHCR has been called into question (Bakewell 2001)). Attention also needs to be paid to the problems of long-term protracted refugee crises, the related economic, security and protection issues and the lack of solutions up to now. The link to livelihoods is important here too, since a livelihoods approach to forced migrants may be just as valid as to poor people in general.

²⁰ See <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z2arcon.htm>

5. CONCLUSIONS

There are estimated to be between 20 and 50 million migrants in Africa, although statistical data on migration flows are incomplete and often outdated, and there are significant undocumented flows. The most important countries of immigration are Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa, whilst Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Gambia and South Africa are all significant countries of emigration. Migration to Europe and the United States consists predominantly of educated individuals, giving rise to considerable concern over the issue of 'brain drain'. However, once again data is incomplete, and some claims may be exaggerated. International migrants also appear to remit significant amounts of money to Africa through both formal and informal channels.

Internal migration involves men, women and children, and includes rural-rural, urban-rural and urban-urban flows as well as rural-urban movements. Links between rural and urban areas developed by migration are significant in promoting remittances, encouraging community level initiatives for the construction of public facilities and infrastructure, and linking rural producers to urban markets. Although evidence is patchy, patterns of internal migration appear to have been affected by economic crisis and structural adjustment, with some arguing that a long trend of urbanisation across the continent has been stopped or even reversed, sometimes with negative effects on rural livelihoods.

Occupational diversification in rural areas is often inextricably linked to mobility. Migration has also been a key factor in shaping settlement patterns and livelihoods. One recent study by IIED found that a staggering 50-80 per cent of rural households had at least one migrant member across all wealth categories. It also found an increasing involvement of women as independent migrants. However, the study also found that remittances had declined over a 15-year period, largely as a result of employment insecurity in destination areas, even though at the same time rural households had become more dependent on these remittances.

Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed significant flows of forced migrants, including internally-displaced people and victims of trafficking. However, peace initiatives in a number of African countries suggest that attention needs to be turned urgently towards facilitating sustainable return. Large-scale migration flows in sub-Saharan Africa have implications for meeting the Millennium Development Goals. By channelling resources directly to poor people, migration

may help combat poverty, and allow investments in education and health care. However, the migration of children may take them out of school, and/or limit the ability of education systems to increase enrolment ratios. There may also be both positive and negative impacts on gender equality, and on initiatives to combat HIV/AIDS.

Support to processes of regional dialogue could help to bolster migrant workers' rights and facilitate the potential gains from more liberal policies on labour migration. The African Union has drafted a 'strategic framework' for a policy on migration (African Union 2004). But across sub-Saharan Africa, the position of governments towards migration has often remained neutral or hostile. At present, PRSPs show considerable ambivalence towards migration, with the subject either not mentioned at all, or seen as contributing to population growth, urban squalor, the breakdown of traditional family structures, crime, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, land degradation and/or rural poverty. Government policies also remain overwhelmingly restrictive, although some governments have become very aware of the potential benefits of linking up with migrant diasporas in Europe and North America.

Eleven countries are signatories to the Migrant Workers Convention – more than in any other world region. The ILO has designed and launched an 'African Labour Migration Policy Initiative' which seeks to enhance the knowledge base on labour migration and build capacity of labour ministries and others to deal with labour migration.

In relation to the brain drain, there is particular concern about the impacts on health of the migration of doctors and nurses. The impact of migration on health outcomes for poor people is felt not only through migration of health personnel to northern countries, but also through regional migration flows (e.g. to South Africa, Namibia and elsewhere), rural-urban migration within countries, and through 'migration' from the public to the private sector. However, policy in this sector needs to recognise the need of health professionals to gain skills and career enhancement through short-term mobility.

However, despite emerging interest in migration in sub-Saharan Africa, there remain significant knowledge gaps:

- International remittances appear to be much smaller in Africa than in any other world region, representing just 10 per cent of external finance in 2001, compared to 63 per cent in South Asia, and 56 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa. However, this

is partly because almost two thirds of sub-Saharan African countries simply do not report any data on remittances, suggesting that investment in monitoring systems would be of some value.

- Data on the mobility of professionals in Africa remains poor, and might be best collected through cooperation with institutions in destination rather than sending countries. The complex relationship between international migration, training and labour market change also remain relatively underexplored.
- There is scope for the development of more effective regional policies on forced migration, which pay attention to the problems of long-term protracted refugee crises, the related economic, security and protection issues and the lack of solutions for many populations. The link to livelihoods is important here too, with a relative dearth of knowledge about effective livelihood strategies that are open to displaced populations.

In thinking about policy on migration in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to consider both migration policies *per se*, e.g. immigration control, facilitation of temporary and regional mobility, policies on refugees and trafficking, and also sectoral policies where migration is a relevant issue. The development of health and education strategies can be made more effective by taking into account the likely consequences of internal and international migration on resource allocation decisions, whilst policies to support poor people's livelihoods need to recognise the significance of migration as a livelihood strategy.

APPENDIX 1: MEAN ANNUAL FLOWS TO EUROPE AND US, 1995-2000

	To Europe (1)	USA (2)	Total (Europe USA)	and Population (3)	Av annual emigration rate % 1995- 2000
East Africa					
Somalia	5949	2744	8693	8175320	0.11
Ethiopia	2749	5081	7831	61266000	0.01
Kenya	2336	1632	3968	28726000	0.01
Eritrea	770	686	1457	3879000	0.04
Tanzania	759	435	1194	32128480	0.00
Uganda	710	372	1082	21040000	0.01
Rwanda	744	92	836	7284000	0.01
Burundi	326	36	362	6548190	0.01
Djibouti	42	16	59	608150	0.01
Total East Africa	14385	11095	25481	169655140	0.02
Central Africa					
Congo, Dem. Rep.	4175	262	4437	48178170	0.01
Cameroon	2120	765	2885	14238860	0.02
Congo, Rep.	1067	94	1161	2850060	0.04
Equatorial Guinea	538	3	541	433060	0.12
Sao Tome	233	5	238	141700	0.17
Gabon	117	18	136	1167290	0.01
CAR	93	9	102	3603400	0.00
Chad	56	16	72	7282870	0.00
Total Central Africa	8400	1171	9571	77895410	0.01
Western Africa					
Nigeria	7204	7736	14940	120817300	0.01
Ghana	5840	4563	10403	18449370	0.06
Senegal	4894	480	5374	9033530	0.06
Cape Verde	2514	951	3465	412240	0.84
Sudan	1386	1650	3036	29978890	0.01
Liberia	981	1817	2798	2961520	0.09
Cote d'Ivoire	2046	377	2423	15159110	0.02
Sierra Leone	910	1374	2284	4830480	0.05
Togo	1155	225	1380	4258140	0.03
Mali	1258	97	1354	10333640	0.01
Gambia, The	1008	196	1204	1223810	0.10
Guinea	965	98	1063	7086120	0.01
Guinea-Bissau	884	89	973	1149330	0.08
Mauritania	583	48	631	2493120	0.03
Burkina Faso	528	21	549	10730330	0.01
Niger	180	212	392	10125740	0.00
Benin	306	46	353	5950330	0.01
Western Sahara	1	1	2	-	-
Total Western Africa	32642	19980	52622	254993000	0.02

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	To Europe (1)	USA (2)	Total (Europe USA)	and Population (3)	Av annual emigration rate 1995- 2000 %
Southern Africa					
South Africa	10825	2323	13148	41402390	0.03
Mauritius	2700	54	2754	1159730	0.24
Angola	2056	82	2138	12401580	0.02
Zimbabwe	1653	275	1928	12153850	0.02
Zambia	584	213	796	9665710	0.01
Namibia	607	26	633	1681820	0.04
Madagascar	584	37	621	14592380	0.00
Malawi	514	55	569	9884000	0.01
Comoros	290	2	291	530820	0.05
Mozambique	221	45	266	16965000	0.00
Botswana	208	14	222	1614190	0.01
Seychelles	52	14	66	78850	0.08
Swaziland	18	13	31	990530	0.00
Lesotho	15	8	22	1978090	0.00
Others	59	-	-	-	-
Total Southern Africa	20385	3158	23484	125098940	0.02
Africa - Others	8413	-	-	-	-
Total Africa	84226	35404	111157	627642490	0.02

Notes:

(1) Immigration of Africa citizens to European countries, by citizenship, 1995-2001, Copyright Eurostat. All Rights Reserved

(2) US Immigrants Admitted by region and country of birth fiscal years 1995-2001, 2002 Year Book of Immigration Statistics, US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics 2003

(3) Population Estimate 1998, World Development Indicators Data Query Service: <http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query>

APPENDIX 2: AVAILABILITY OF DATA ON INTERNAL MIGRATION

Countries	Last census	Next census	Census includes internal migration data?	Internal migration survey
East Africa				
Somalia	1987	2003	No	No
Ethiopia	1994	2004	Yes	1999 Labour Force Survey
Kenya	1999	2009	Yes	No
Eritrea	1984	2003	Yes	No
Tanzania	2002		No	No
Uganda	2002		Yes	No
Rwanda	2002		Yes	No
Burundi	1990		No	No
Djibouti	1983	2003	Yes	No
Central Africa				
Congo, DR				
Cameroon	1987	2003	Yes	No
Congo, Rep.				
Eq. Guinea	1994		No	No
Sao Tome	2001		No	No
Gabon	1993	2003	Yes	No
CAR	1988	2003	Yes	No
Chad	1993	2003	Yes	No
West Africa				
Nigeria	1991	2004	No	Survey of internal migration and tourism Migration Research Study in Ghana (1995)
Ghana	2000	2010	Yes	
Senegal	2002	2009	Yes	No
Cape Verde	2000	2010	Yes	No
Sudan	1993	2003	Yes	No
Liberia	1984	2003	Yes	No
Cote d'Ivoire				
Sierra Leone	1985	2003	Yes	No
Togo	1981		Yes	No
Mali	1998	2008	Yes	No
Gambia, The	1993	2003	Yes	No
Guinea	1996		Yes	No
Guinea-Bissau	1991		No	No
Mauritania	2000		Yes	No
Burkina Faso	1996	2006	Yes	No
Niger	2001		Yes	Survey of migration and urbanisation (1993)
Benin	2002		Yes	No
Western Sahara				

Continued on next page ...

Countries	Last census	Next census	Census includes internal migration data?	Internal migration survey
Southern Africa				
South Africa	2001	2006	Yes	University of Pretoria Project on Internal Migration
Mauritius	2000	2010	Yes	No
Angola	1970	2004	No	No
Zimbabwe	2002		Yes	No
Zambia	2000	2010	Yes	No
Namibia	2001	2011	Yes	Intercensal demographic survey
Madagascar	1993	2003	Yes	No
Malawi	1998	2008	No	No
Comoros	1991		No	No
Mozambique	1997		Yes	No
Botswana	2001	2011	Yes	No
Seychelles	2002		Yes	No
Swaziland	1997	2007	Yes	Demographic and Housing Survey
Lesotho	2001	2005	Yes	No

Source: Data compiled from website of Queensland Centre for Population Research, <http://www.geosp.uq.edu.au/qcpr/database/IMdata/Imdata.htm>

APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY OF PRSP COMMENTS ON MIGRATION

Country	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Policy
Benin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emigration of children causes poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Movement from land scarce areas to land available areas 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None
Burkina Faso	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development inequalities cause migration Internal and external migration exacerbate HIV/AIDS 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incentives to prevent young people abandoning their land Narrow development gaps between regions
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Displaced people depend on charity 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socio-economic reintegration of displaced prioritised
Cameroon				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ICTs to prevent rural outmigration Train and recruit teachers to prevent migration to foreign universities Limit outmigration by promoting income generating activities in rural areas
Cape Verde	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restrictive measures in host countries have cut remittances Rural-urban migration transfers problems to urban environment 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emigration a social buffer Emigration a survival strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote remittances Engage emigrants in implementing national development strategy Develop ethnic markets abroad Reunite families and relocate displaced communities
DR Congo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass displacement a problem 			
Côte d'Ivoire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Domestic and foreign migration impoverishes the vulnerable Immigration linked to soaring crime 			
Djibouti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Urban migration caused by drought 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Need study of effects of immigration
Ethiopia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spontaneous migration causes NR degradation 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Planned resettlement from highland to lowland can be 	

beneficial

Gambia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immigration leads to high population growth rates • Rural areas left underpopulated • New problems in urban areas • Economic downturn has reduced opportunities in urban areas without promoting return 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seasonal return during rainy months 	
Ghana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration from N caused by poverty 		
Guinea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Urban problems exacerbated by 'urban drift' 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aim to improve mobility through improved road network
Kenya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration breaks down traditional social protection 		
Malawi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty of S partly caused by migration • Illegal immigration causes crime and undermines integrity of passports • Migration breaks down male-female relations • Male migration leaves illiterate women managing farms and families 		
Mali	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emigration attenuates demographic growth
Mauritania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drought and poor living conditions cause migration of poor • Urbanization creates shanty towns, environmental problems and pressure on services 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create viable jobs in urban areas

Mozambique		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Urbanization low, but rural-urban migration likely in future 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	
Niger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal and external migration helps spread HIV/AIDS • Outmigration a cause of poverty 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migrant remittances an important source of household income 	
Rwanda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distress migration in some areas due to drought 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The 'money rich' migrate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seasonal migration of labour a 'social mechanism' • Loss of outmigration options has negatively affected poor households 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Priority to resettlement of the displaced
São Tomé and Príncipe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty causes migration to cities 			
Senegal			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emigrants can revitalise economic activities in rural areas through investment, advice and identification of niches for rural products 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outreach to migrants • Incentives for emigrants to invest in rural production
Sierra Leone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal displacement disrupted agriculture, education, spread crime and HIV/AIDS 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on improving living standards of displaced and returnees

Source: PRSP and IPRSP documents for each country, searched March 2004.

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