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**Migration and Pro-Poor Policy in East Africa**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB	African Development Bank
CEAC	Economic Community of Central African States
CEPGL	Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPEC	International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
MFIs	Micro-Finance Institutions
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
MTOs	Money Transfer Organisations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RGDN	Rwanda Global Disapora Network
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USDOS	United States Department of State

## **ABSTRACT**

This paper reports on the findings of a survey conducted by the Sussex Centre for Migration Research on migration and pro-poor policy in Africa. The survey covered existing literature, and discussions with DFID country offices across the continent, and was conducted in early 2004. The paper is complemented by three separate papers, on Africa in general, West and Southern Africa, which are published separately by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, and together by the Department for International Development.

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

East Africa has a long history of labour migration between and within countries to plantations (cotton and coffee in Uganda), mines (DRC and Uganda) and with the seasons (pastoralist communities in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya). In the post-colonial era, there has also been substantial forced displacement, and increasing rural-urban migration within countries for employment or to earn a livelihood. However, both urbanization rates and levels of international migration remain generally lower than in other parts of Africa.

### **1.1 Migration and the Poor**

The extent to which rural households engage in short and long-term migration to maintain and diversify household income and reduce risk in the face of agro-climatic constraints is relatively well documented in East Africa. Studies have shown that rural families increase their livelihood security by splitting the locations of the family. Research in Western Kenya suggests that the decision to migrate, and remittance behaviour, are linked to a form of inter-generational 'migration contract' between a migrant and his or her parents, in which the (usually male) migrant moves and sends remittances in expectation of a subsequent inheritance. In southern Tanzania, research by IIED suggests that male migration to save and invest in rural areas is also common, although return is less so. In contrast, in northern Tanzania, opportunities for migration appear to be especially important for marginalized women.

## 1.2 Migration and Education

An interesting feature of East African migration is the circulation of children in order to obtain education. Although helping to build national rather than ethnic identity, migration for education means that secondary school pupils can circulate each term over very large distances. It may also encourage onward migration once schooling is completed. Yet education also appears to be a major focus of the community, and remittances are often invested in school fees. Those who have educated relatives in urban areas also appear to receive larger remittances and are therefore able to send a higher proportion of their children to school, perpetuating inequality from one generation to the next.

## 1.3 Knowledge Gaps

There are a number of key knowledge gaps concerning migration and displacement within and from East Africa:

- Although useful research exists, there remains a need for deeper understanding of the relationships between migration and development in the region, including estimates of the scale of internal migration and its impact on rural livelihoods. In most countries in East Africa, recent survey data on internal migration that is nationally representative is simply unavailable.
- The lack of reliable estimates of the numbers of East Africans living abroad, their economic contribution to East African countries, and the effect of their exodus on availability of skilled professionals in sectors such as health and education, may explain why international migration flows appear low across the region. Particular attention may need to be paid to migration to South Africa and the Gulf.
- Understanding of the significance and socio-economic impact of immigration into East African countries, including that of temporary workers and refugees, is also a priority. Such understanding could contribute to a more informed policy debate in the face of proposals to limit migration (as recently in Kenya) or to adopt a more restrictive stance towards refugees (as recently seen in Tanzania).

## 1.4 Can Policy on Migration in East Africa be Effective?

The extent of the turnaround in policy on emigration from Uganda is quite substantial, and reflects the new goal of the Ugandan government to develop the potential economic contribution of the diaspora, rather than encouraging them not to leave. This could form a model for other countries in the region, although for some countries, conflict resolution and the rebuilding of failed states is clearly a more urgent priority.

In Uganda, the liberalisation of financial markets, especially trade in foreign exchange, and the granting of permission for foreign denominated bank accounts, are said to have increased remittances. The Bank of Uganda Forex and Trade Department is now generally supportive and positively inclined towards granting permission to Money Transfer Organisations (MTOs). There is also some interest in using Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) as providers of money transfer services, and evidence across the region suggests that these may be more effective in channelling resources to the poorest than international banks and corporations that lack local knowledge.

## 2 REGION-WIDE ISSUES

East Africa has a long history of labour migration between and within countries to plantations (cotton and coffee in Uganda), mines (DRC and Uganda) and with the seasons (pastoralist communities in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya). In the colonial era, labour migration was orientated mainly from Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire to Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, as well as more recently from Sudan and the Horn of Africa to the Middle East (De Haan 2000). There is also a history of rural-urban migration within countries for employment or to earn a livelihood, although urbanization rates remain generally lower than in much of West or South Africa.

### Box 1: Migration and Education

One interesting feature of East African migration is the circulation of children in order to obtain education. Such flows have historical precedents in the pre-colonial and colonial education systems, and form an important part of mobility within Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. These patterns were maintained at least until the 1980s, despite greater availability of schools within daily commuting distance.

For example, the national admission systems to secondary schools in all three countries mean that pupils can be allocated places in schools anywhere in the country, some of which are boarding schools and others which are not. This system, created to encourage the building of a national rather than ethnic identity, means that secondary school pupils can circulate each term over very large distances.

Migration for education may also encourage onward migration once schooling is completed. The higher availability of formal sector jobs in towns, and higher wages available there, are also relevant factors.

*Sources:* Gould (1985); Mukyanuzi (2003)

A major focus of literature on migration flows and processes in East Africa is circulation. This process of temporary or semi-permanent migration from a rural area to another rural or an urban area for employment is characterised by the links maintained with the area of origin. These circulation patterns have strong historical roots in East Africa: e.g. in Buganda, before colonisation, it was traditional to send young men to live and work with other relatives for some years in order to gain a better understanding of Bugandan culture (Gould 1985). There has also been substantial movement of pastoralists (Oucho 1995).

Colonial labour laws enforced patterns of circulatory migration. They divided the areas of production and reproduction, moving African families into labour reserves, from which men were recruited to work in cities or on plantations. The rest of a family had to remain in the reserves, subsisting on crops grown in the area without the help of the most active members of the family. In this context, cash remittances from family members working in the colonial economy assumed considerable importance (Gould 1995).

Since the 1980s, labour circulation has decreased and refugee flows have started to dominate movement (Oucho 1995). According to the IOM Migration Policy Framework for sub-Saharan Africa:

'This subregion has been, and is, experiencing movements of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) ... Much of the voluntary migration that characterized the Eastern African Community (EAC) countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda ceased by 1978 and has never resurfaced in the resuscitated Economic Community of Central African States (CEAC) (since 1996). Countries in the sub-region do not have explicit policies on migration and no sub-regional cooperation mechanism to respond to their common migration challenges.'

On rural-urban migration, it has been argued that following economic decline and the impacts of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s, the real incomes of a large proportion of the urban population declined dramatically (Potts 1995). As a result, urban growth has slowed considerably in countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, giving way to return migration to rural areas in some cases. Nonetheless, out-migration continues, notably to the Gulf (IOM, 2003).

**Table 1: Selected Development and Migration Indicators for East African Countries**

Country	Population (millions) 2000	GDP per capita (US\$ PPP <sup>1</sup> ) 2000	Human Development Index (HDI) <sup>2</sup> 2000	Migrant stock <sup>3</sup> (%) 2000	Average annual net migration rate (per 1000) 1995-2000
Angola	13.1	2187	0.403	0.4	-1.4
Burundi	6.3	591	0.313	1.2	-12.9
Djibouti	0.6	2377	0.445	4.5	6.8
DR Congo	50.9	765	0.431	1.5	-7.1
Eritrea	3.7	837	0.421	0.4	0.6
Ethiopia	62.9	668	0.327	1.0	-0.1
Kenya	30.7	1022	0.513	1.1	-0.1
Rwanda	7.6	943	0.403	1.2	62.8
Somalia	8.8	795*	0.284*	0.2	-0.6
Sudan	31.1	1797	0.499	2.5	-2.6
Tanzania	35.1	522	0.440	2.5	-1.4
Uganda	23.3	1208	0.444	2.3	-0.6

Source: Figures compiled from UNDP and UN Population Division.

Notes: <sup>1</sup> Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is an adjustment of the Gross Domestic Product to account for price differences across countries and allow comparison of real incomes.

<sup>2</sup> The Human Development Index is calculated on the basis of statistics on life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, gross educational enrolment ratio and GDP per capita (PPP, \$US).

<sup>3</sup> Refers to the percentage of the population born outside the country

\*Somali figures for 2001

A number of key themes emerge in relation to migration in the East African region, including:

- The importance of circulation, building on historic patterns of labour migration from rural areas to towns and cities and to areas of mining and plantation agriculture
- The development of a range of informal remittance systems that have transferred money both within countries, and more recently from international migrants (see Box 2), although trust in these systems is eroding in some cases (see Box 5)
- A degree of regional integration that has fostered mobility between East African countries (see Boxes 3 and 8)
- For Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the existence of a number of empirical studies on the use of migrant remittances by the poor (see Box 4), which could contribute to an understanding of how pro-poor policy could take migration into account
- Despite this empirical base of knowledge, continuing worries about the negative consequences of migration on the part of a number of key policy-makers in the region, although the Ugandan government appears to have developed a more positive attitude towards linking with the diaspora (see Box 6)
- The rising significance of forced migration (including internal displacement – see Box 7), although more recently this has given way to substantial return of refugees and IDPs in some countries.

In this section, in addition to a broad overview, we focus on particular studies in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Work on Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda is then considered in more detail in subsequent country sections.

## 2.1 Importance of Migration to the Poor

Migration is of considerable importance to the poor in East Africa. Historically, the migration of millions of rural households in eastern and southern Africa has provided investment capital for rural commodity production, stimulated the flow of new ideas and social practices into rural areas, and enhanced rural livelihoods (Francis 2002). Decreasing agricultural incomes across East Africa since the 1970s have led to a diversification of livelihood sources, and migration is a likely outcome in areas with easy access to labour markets (Francis 2000). The impact of urban economic decline

has also been felt by the poor, although many public sector workers previously considered to be amongst the 'labour aristocracy' have perhaps been hit hardest.

### 2.1.1 Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, interesting information on the relationship between migration and poverty is available from DFID-funded work on livelihoods. This has shown that the poor migrate more than the better off, in order to supplement income from the land, and repay or avoid incurring debts (De Haan et al, 2000). Although permanent or semi-permanent migration were seen by most families as an option of last resort, temporary seasonal migrations were often actively encouraged as a right of passage for young men. However, it is those with some assets, rather than none, who were found most able to migrate.

Migration may affect the poor, but the impact of migration on poverty is more difficult to determine (Goodrich 2001). Thus, although migration plays a central role in the livelihoods of rural households and communities, rich and poor, it was found that migration may increase inequality. The research also did not produce comparable quantitative estimates of the impact of migration on livelihoods. In fact, one of the lessons learned was that it was difficult to

generalise. In policy terms, particularly, it was seen to be important to be aware of specific contexts in order that policies could be as supportive as possible.

A study of female Ethiopian migrants to the Middle East also showed that many women are trafficked to destinations outside Ethiopia and are left in vulnerable positions, partly due to the strict laws surrounding the migration of women (Kebede 2001). When in the Middle East, most of the women work as maids or nannies, in jobs with little security or protection. The report partially blames the patriarchal Ethiopian society and the lack of education and career opportunities for women within Ethiopia as a cause of these exploitative forms of migration.

#### **Box 2: Informal Remittance Systems**

Recent estimates suggest that Somali money transfer companies deal with approximately \$750 million in transfers to the country each year, yet these systems are largely 'informal' in comparison with western banks.

Somali remittance companies utilise the 'Hawalla' system, which relies on trust and ethnic bonds to transfer money around the world.

Initially unregulated, concerns over the need for financial regulation have been raised in response to accusations of money laundering and links to Al Qaida following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks. As a result, the Somali Financial Services Association (SFSA) was launched in 2003.

*Source: Omer (2003)*

### 2.1.2 Somalia

In Somalia, it is international migration that has received most attention, not least because of the collapse of the state, and with it virtually all social science research within the country. Somalis have moved in large numbers to Europe and North America, and in the US at least, census data shows that Somalis are less educated than any other African nationality, and indeed the only African country of origin where educational levels are below the US national average. However, interestingly, Somali international migrants have remitted quite large sums to the country even in the absence of a formal banking system (see Box 2).

### 2.1.3 Other East African Countries

In other East African countries there are further examples of innovative formal and informal mechanisms to transfer remittances, including the use of bus and courier companies (Sander 2003). Another innovative semi-formal system, although not actually a money transfer system which has sprung up in Uganda and Tanzania, is the transfer of pre-paid airtime on mobile phones to relatives (with the pin code being passed around). This saves the relatives money in buying airtime and allows them to use it for other expenses.

## 2.2 **International Migration and the 'Brain Drain'**

International migration from Somalia may have brought substantial remittances, but in most other countries of the region it is seen as a major problem because of the 'brain drain'. In Ethiopia, it has been estimated that between a quarter and three quarters of students and professionals travelling abroad to study have not returned, with the loss greatest to the academic and medical professions (Shinn 2002). Indeed, Ethiopia has the largest number of nationals of any East African nation in the US, and the second largest in Africa after Nigeria. As for Sudan, by 1995, it was estimated that some 500,000 skilled Sudanese were working abroad (IOM 2003).

There has also been some circulation of professionals within East Africa, not all of it voluntary (e.g. Kenya and Tanzania benefited from the immigration of professionals from Uganda during the Amin era).

## 2.3 Migration Policies

An International Migration Policy Conference for East Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region, was held in Nairobi, Kenya in May 2002, and brought together 170 high, senior and middle level government officials from Burundi, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Yemen. The conference, believed to be the first of its kind in the region, identified a series of migration and forced displacement issues of interest and concern, including:

- Forced displacement (refugee protection and asylum; regional processing of secondary migratory movements; IDP access and assistance; mobility and human security; protracted displacement situations; migration, forced displacement and conflict resolution; crisis prevention and conflict resolution; and media sensitisation to issues of displacement and media as a tool for awareness raising)
- The management of labour migration (maximising remittances; pre-departure training; bilateral agreements to avoid double taxation; monitoring circular migration; brain drain; registration and supervision of foreign employment agencies; ensuring migrant workers' rights at home and abroad; integration and re-integration; strengthening co-operation with African diaspora; matching labour needs and demand; and facilitating exchange of knowledge, skills and resources);
- The establishment of a Strategic Framework for an Integrated Policy on Migration on the African Continent (including partnerships between African countries and the EU; and inter-State dialogue and co-operation concerning return, readmission and re-integration).

### Box 3: Regional Passports

The EAC has also recently introduced new 'East African passports' and temporary passes to speed up movement between countries in the region, as well as abolishing charges on the temporary importation of private vehicles across regional borders, and establishing special immigration counters for East African travelers at the region's airports. The passports cost US\$10 and have six months' multiple entry validity. New policies are also being considered on the application of national status treatment to East African nationals in any of the Partner States with respect to access to services in the fields of health, education and training, tourism and communications, among others.

*Source:* EAC Information and Publications Office

With respect to labour migration, a number of policy initiatives can be highlighted across the region. There are regional initiatives to promote free movement in the East African Community (see Box 2). COMESA countries also plan to establish the free movement of citizens as part of the creation of a free trade area, although there have been few signs of progress so far.<sup>1</sup>

ILO has a sectoral programme on the elimination of the worst forms of child labour in the commercial agriculture sector in East Africa, working with the governments of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia and funded by the US Department of Labor. There has recently been a mid-term evaluation of this programme.

In addition, IOM's MIDA project has made greater strides in East Africa than elsewhere in the continent, with one initiative aimed at building capacity in the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to provide protection to their citizens working abroad and to expand legal labour migration opportunities for the benefit and development of their countries of origin.

However, measures to promote freer movement have not received universal acclaim, and in some cases, policies have worked in the opposite direction. In Ethiopia, the ADB has awarded \$86 million in loans and grants in order to control what it sees as a massive explosion in rural to urban migration. This will be used for investments in rural areas, such as infrastructure development and credit facilities for rural farmers, in an attempt to increase rural enterprise and prevent people having to move to the cities (IRIN 2003b).

In the case of the EAC, the issue of labour migration has met resistance from some member states because of the different levels of advancement in training of human resources in the three countries (Mwamunyange 2003). Thus whilst Kenya enrolls about 45,000 students in its institutions of higher learning, Uganda admits only 20,000 and Tanzania just 7,000, leading to fears in the latter two countries that Kenyans will flood their job markets and render citizens of their countries jobless.

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<sup>1</sup> Chapter 28, Article 164 COMESA Treaty, 1994, [http://www.comesa.int/about/treaty/treaty\\_pdf](http://www.comesa.int/about/treaty/treaty_pdf)

At a recent conference, Uganda's Minister of State responsible for Gender, Labour and Social Development, Henry Joseph Obbo, commented that the harmonisation of labour laws, labour migration and free movement of persons needed to take into account the aspect of the level of training in each country, although Kenya's Minister for Labour and Human Resources Development, Ali Chirau Mwakwere, expressed reservations in turn about Pakistanis who had 'flooded' the Kenyan job market while many Kenyans were jobless.

In relation to forced migration, there have also been efforts to develop a regional set of policies. In April 2002, a consortium of NGOs hosted a regional meeting in Mombasa that sought to promote a 'progressive legislative and policy framework' across the region (African NGOs Refugee Protection Network 2002). At a subsequent meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in September 2003, Tanzania proposed the introduction of a policy of 'safe havens' in conflict-ridden countries as a way of averting large-scale refugee movements, as well as regional burden sharing arrangements, whilst Zambia proposed the introduction of measures to allow refugees to become economic players in the host country, thereby reducing the burden on the host (IRINa 2003). Although this conference, which brought together representatives from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, UNHCR and the AU, failed to reach agreement on these proposals, governments did recommit to the principle of refugee protection in the region.

## 2.4 Key Issues and Policy Gaps

Large-scale displacement from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC has made this region a key area for discussion of policies on refugees and IDPs. Historically, Tanzania had one of the most progressive pieces of refugee legislation in the world, although state practice has become much more restrictive since the presence of over a million Rwandans in the country from 1994-96. It is reassuring that the notion of a 'progressive' policy on forced migration is now on the agenda, along with regional passports and free movement of workers, even if these still raise problems for some in government.

However, although dealing with forced displacement continues to be an important issue in the region, it is not unreasonable to expect that the return of refugees and IDPs might gain increasing importance in the coming years. After large-scale returns to Rwanda in late 1996, there have been

some returns at least to countries such as Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Somaliland. Here, it is clearly important for countries (and refugee agencies) to learn from experience in different countries about what kind of assistance is needed by returnees, and the most appropriate policies to promote an economic, political and social environment in which return can have positive outcomes.

As elsewhere on the continent, it is probably internal migration that is most significant for the poor in most countries, and where policy gaps are therefore most conspicuous. This issue is considered in more depth below, in relation to four specific East African countries, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda.

### 3 KENYA

According to a recent review of international migration from Kenya (Okoth 2003), in 2001 there were 47,000 Kenyan nationals in the US, 20,600 in Canada and 15,000 in the UK. In the 1980s and 1990s, this appears increasingly to reflect permanent, rather than circular migration, due to the political and economic instability in Kenya. Many workers also travelled to the Gulf States, and also interestingly to Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo in search of low skilled employment during the 1990s. There was also recruitment of Kenyan teachers to countries as diverse as the Comoros Islands, Seychelles, Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo.

In contrast, there are few accurate statistics about internal migration. Census material on migration is not available since the last published census in 1989, and there has been little analysis of this. It seems likely that areas around Nairobi and Mombasa and the coast, as well as areas of commercial farming, are net areas of immigration, whilst there continues to be net out-migration from much of Western and Northern Kenya.

Kenya also hosts refugees from the surrounding countries, and acts as a transit point for resettlement to third countries such as the US. In 2002, Kenya hosted just over 230,000 refugees and asylum seekers from neighbouring countries, notably Somalia and Sudan.<sup>2</sup> There are also significant numbers of IDPs in Kenya. The reasons for displacement are complex, but are linked to

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<sup>2</sup> Data from [www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)

land redistribution, inter-ethnic clashes and the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992. There are hopes that the NARC government under Mwai Kibaki elected in December 2002 will begin to solve some of the problems that caused these people to flee, and enable them to return home (see below).<sup>3</sup>

### 3.1 Importance of Migration to the Poor

The extent to which rural households engage in short and long-term migration to maintain and diversify household income and reduce risk in the face of agro-climatic constraints is well documented in Kenya. Studies have shown that rural families increase their livelihood security by splitting the locations of the family, most often by one member of the family migrating to an urban area (Bigsten 1996). This may be necessary in marginal areas as there is insufficient economic capital in rural areas to diversify sources of income without migration (Oniang'o 1995). Research carried out under DFID's Natural Resources Policy Research Programme (NRPRP) shows, in a small sample in Makueni district, not only that over half of households surveyed had access to migrant income, but that this was also larger and more secure than income from local wage labour, and had contributed to investment in farming (Nelson 2000).

In addition to rural-urban migration, seasonal and temporary migration for agricultural employment is common in rural areas, and is used to increase family income. Pastoralists in northern Kenya still operate a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, with implications for access to services. In areas where families own marginal land the men will move seasonally to gain waged employment in order to provide cash to support their families; this leads to short term circulation patterns (Oniang'o 1995).

#### **Box 4: The Use of internal remittances in Kenya**

The phenomenon of male labour migration from Western Kenya to urban areas has received considerable attention from economists. One study argues that through remittances and investment, this labour migration leads to a greater differentiation between the rich and poor farmers in the area, although most investment of remittances is not in land or farming techniques but on housing improvements and children's education.

Education also appears to be a major focus of the community, and remittances are often invested in school fees. Those who have educated relatives in urban areas also appear to receive larger remittances and are therefore able to send a higher proportion of their children to school, perpetuating inequality from one generation to the next.

*Source:* Francis and Hoddinott (1993); Francis (2002)

<sup>3</sup>See <http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/IdpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/KenyaProfile+Summary>

However, most academic and policy attention has focused on rural-urban migration systems, which also commonly includes circulation. Agesa looks at the economic determinants of joint migration of the whole family against sequential migration of the (male) head of household, followed by other members. He concludes that due to women's lower earning abilities in urban areas, families are likely to engage in sequential migration to decrease the costs and risks taken and to increase the benefits and income (Agesa 1996). Higher levels of male education also contribute to greater levels of migration amongst men than amongst women (Agesa and Agesa 1999).

Path-breaking work in Western Kenya by John Hoddinott suggests that the decision to migrate, and remittance behaviour, are linked to a form of inter-generational 'migration contract' between a migrant and his or her parents, in which the (usually male) migrant moves and sends remittances in expectation of a subsequent inheritance (Hoddinott 1994).

In terms of the consequences of migration for the poor, Oucho discusses the problems of balancing the costs and returns to rural areas of rural-urban migration, in terms of loss of labour, the cost of supporting the move and establishment in the town, returns in the forms of remittances, both economic and socio-cultural, and the eventual return migration. He argues that migration creates dependency in rural areas of Western Kenya on urban migrants and remittances (Oucho 1996).

In addition to internal migration, international migration also has consequences for the poor. Kenya is country of origin and transit for trafficked persons, primarily women and children. Internal trafficking is reported to occur, with an estimated 200,000 street children in Kenya, a significant number of whom are believed to be engaged in forced labour or illegal activities, including prostitution (USDOS 2003). Women are also reported to be trafficked to Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries, while children are sent to Uganda. Women from Eastern Europe and Asia are also believed to be sent through Kenya en route to western countries.

With respect to remittances from abroad, Kenya has no official data, but apparently received in the order of KSH 32 billion (about \$420 million) in 2002.<sup>4</sup> Internal remittances are also significant, with recent estimates suggesting that migrants in urban areas remit between 13 and 22 per cent of their

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<sup>4</sup> The figure is based on conversations with staff of commercial banks in Kenya in January 2003.

average incomes, whilst migration earnings constitute 20 per cent of total non-farm earnings even in remote rural areas, and up to 75 per cent of total non-farm earnings in areas close to major cities (de Haan 2000).

In a recent study of how remittances are sent, the important role of commercial banks was highlighted. Services such as telegraphic transfers, electronic funds transfers and bank drafts are typically used for large value transfers, as they offer the cheapest service for the transfer of large amounts. However, for smaller amounts, informal means or post office transfers are used, the latter especially in the case of domestic transfers, whilst bus and courier companies were also noted as important means to transport remittances (Kabucho et al. 2003).

### 3.2 International Migration and the 'Brain Drain'

Evidence on the extent of the 'brain drain' in Kenya remains somewhat circumstantial, but this has not stopped the issue receiving some public prominence inside the country. Just 152 Kenyan trained nurses were registered to work in the UK in 2002/03 (Bach 2003)<sup>5</sup>, hardly a major problem if correct and reflected in other destination countries. Yet it is reported that only one out of 14 recent recipients of doctoral degrees in molecular biology have stayed in the country to continue to conduct research, with the others moving to Europe or North America.<sup>6</sup>

Kenya's Health Minister, Charity Ngilu, is quoted as saying that out of 6,000 doctors trained in Kenya, just 600 remain in the country's public hospitals (Kaul 2003), whilst it is estimated that as many as 20 Kenyan doctors are leaving the country every month for better positions elsewhere (Shinn 2002). A recent news article discussing why many professionals overseas do not want to return cited political instability as a major cause, as well as the lack of infrastructure (Mwaura 2003).

One point that should be borne in mind is that many people leave Kenya *before* they complete their University education, such that although they represent a 'brain drain' of sorts, the full cost of their education has not been met by the Kenyan state. It has been estimated that 30,000 Kenyans go

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<sup>5</sup> See contribution by Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) [www.nmc-uk.org](http://www.nmc-uk.org)

<sup>6</sup> Citing *The Daily Nation*, 8 March 2001.

overseas to study in Europe, the United States and Asia each year because of the limited access to higher education at home (Salmon 2003).

### 3.3 Migration Policies

In general, policies that have been developed in Kenya in relation to migration view it rather negatively. Kenya's PRSP, although it is light on actual policy prescriptions, clearly has a negative view, stating that 'traditional systems (of social protection) are disappearing due to the break-down of the extended family system, migration, economic hardships and poverty' (Government of Kenya 2000). Efforts have been made to stem the brain drain, although these have received press criticism, as some observers have accused the government of devaluing degrees and making them an expensive waste of time (Salmon 2003). In particular, the introduction of parallel degree programmes, where students pay all of their fees themselves, has not overcome problems of quality control and quality assurance, whilst they appear to have created antipathy and resentment in students enrolled on state-funded degrees.

There have also been some attempts to reverse migration of the highly-skilled. The ROAN scheme in Kenya run by IOM is reported to have returned over 300 professionals to Kenya by the end of 2002 (Shinn 2002). However, Okoth suggests that it is more important to encourage the diaspora to contribute to nation and economy building activities from outside the country, giving examples such as Africa Online, that was founded by a Kenyan in the US, rather than encouraging the highly skilled to return home in a situation where there are high levels of un- and underemployment (Okoth 2003). IOM has introduced a new scheme, MIDA, with just that aim.

A recent and worrying development that runs somewhat counter to previous policy to reverse emigration is the decision by the government not to renew the visas of many expatriate workers where it is judged that a Kenyan could do the job as well.<sup>7</sup>

In relation to trafficking too there are problems, as the US State Department reports that Kenya does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, even though it is making significant efforts to do so despite severe resource constraints (USDOS 2003). For

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<sup>7</sup> 'Kenya Foreign worker visas', BBC website 28/10/03 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3220541.stm>

example, the Children's Act of 2001 prohibits involving children in work that might prevent them from going to school or that is exploitative and hazardous. It also prohibits child sexual exploitation.

Community-based District Advisory Committees, set up to monitor child labour issues at district and local levels, have assisted 2,803 children, including 1,252 found working in hazardous conditions and 297 found working in forced labour conditions. The government is seeking to place street children in youth homes and social halls, providing them with meals and shelter to prevent them from being victimized. It also supports international organizations and NGOs to assist children in domestic service and includes education, skills training, counselling, legal advice, and a shelter for girls abused by their employers. A Human Trafficking Unit within the police was established in 2002, but its focus so far has been on immigration fraud. Government officials were implicated in identification fraud facilitating illegal smuggling and six foreign nationals were deported for suspected smuggling of citizens to the Middle East.

### 3.4 Key Issues and Policy Gaps

One area in which there appears to be a gap in both knowledge and policy relates to the situation of those forcibly displaced within Kenya. International estimates put the number of IDPs in Kenya during the 1990s at over half a million, but despite the election of a new government in 2002, and a parliamentary commitment to resettle displaced people passed in July 2003, relatively few IDPs appear to have returned to their homes so far.<sup>8</sup>

A recent UN report on IDPs in Kenya noted that over 80 per cent of IDPs cited insecurity in their region of origin as their main reason for not returning (Global IDP Database 2003). Given that many IDPs are in urban areas and may be expected to remain there as part of on-going urbanisation trends in the country, and the fact that resettlement proposals so far have been highly controversial, there is also a clear need for greater understanding of their situation and conditions in their current location.

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/KenayProfile+Summary>

## 4 TANZANIA

Like other countries in the region, there is a long history of rural-rural and rural-urban migration in Tanzania, dating back to colonial and indeed pre-colonial times. The country also historically saw significant labour recruitment from neighbouring countries to provide a workforce for plantation agriculture. In post-independence Tanzania, following a Marxist development path, long distance rural to rural migration slowed due to a policy focus on community level farming. However, seasonal labour migration still occurred in rural areas as extra labour was required during harvesting, e.g. to what were communal sisal farms near the coast.

Migration to urban areas has continued unabated, and increased during the programme of government decentralisation and the creation of new provincial capitals in the 1970s. Since the economic liberalisation in the 1980s rural to urban migration has become more permanent, with migrants investing profits in ventures in or near the towns rather than remitting them to their areas of origin.

Tanzania has also seen a dramatic growth in its refugee population. At the height of the Great Lakes refugee crisis from 1993 to 1998, nearly 1.3 million people arrived in Western Tanzania as refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, an influx that increased the populations of the Kagera and Kigoma regions by more than 50 per cent (Whitaker 1999). At the end of 2002 there were still 689,000 refugees in the country, with around 57,000 returns, but also nearly 100,000 new arrivals during 2002.<sup>9</sup> These refugees were mainly from Burundi, but also included over 100,000 from the DRC. The vast majority of these refugees continue to be housed in Kagera and Kigoma, and fall under the responsibility of UNHCR.<sup>10</sup>

### 4.1 Importance of Migration to the Poor

Relatively good and recent information is available about the links between internal migration and poverty in Tanzania, thanks to an IIED study, which looked at movement out of rural areas in both the North and South of the country (Tacoli 2002). In Northern Tanzania, around Mt. Kilimanjaro, the migration of young people, both male and female is very common as a way to increase

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<sup>9</sup> Data from [www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)

<sup>10</sup> However, many more – perhaps as many as half a million – may have also resettled in local villages. See Hoyweghen 2001.

opportunities, especially for marginalized women (Larise 2001).

In contrast to the situation in Kenya reported above, women were found *more* likely to migrate as daughters are usually excluded from land inheritance, encouraging them to move away, either for marriage or work. Destinations of men and women were found to vary. Men were more likely to stay relatively close to their home area, or if they moved to Dar es Salaam, they were likely to be employed or apprenticed with a family member, whereas women were more likely to move further away, to Dar es Salaam or Mombasa, to reduce the shame to their families from working in bars or prostitution. These are often the only sources of employment open to women.

In southern Tanzania, in the remote area of Lindi, over 60 per cent of families interviewed were found to have at least one migrant family member, with this applying to households from across the economic spectrum (Larise 2001b). Young single men were the biggest migrant group, and most went to Dar es Salaam to work as street vendors. Migrants did not move locally to Lindi town due to the lack of opportunities. Married men were more likely to engage in temporary rural agricultural migration on a seasonal basis. Some migrants also moved to settlements and were allocated access to land. Although migrants were found to maintain strong links with their rural origins, return migration remained very unusual, and remittance levels were found to have dropped in the last 10 years, due to increased costs of living.

Despite obvious difficulties faced by rural-urban migrants, it is interesting to note that they are not necessarily the poorest of city dwellers (De Haan 2000). This may be partly because they work

longer hours. However, where migrants find it difficult to survive in urban areas, this may lead to them investing their savings in the urban rather than rural areas. One survey from the early 1990s showed that 90 per cent of urban migrants interviewed had bought land near the town to farm, rather than investing in

**Box 5: Changing Attitudes to Informal Remittance Transfer Mechanisms**

Despite noting the importance of informal remittance transfer mechanisms in East Africa in general, and especially for internal remittances, one important issue is that there appears to be growing mistrust in such informal transfer mechanisms, and growing demand for more formal money transfer mechanisms to be made available and accessible. Safety is a pervasive concern, and this is an area in which bus companies may fill an important niche.

*Source:* Sander (2001)

their home village, since this made it an easier commute and was closer to urban produce markets (Mbonile1994a).

Recent work for DFID on remittances in Tanzania has found that intra-regional and domestic transfers remain costly as a result of limited money transfer options (Sander 2003). Whilst bank transfers are competitive for sending larger amounts in a single transaction, of much greater importance for the poor is the service offered by bus companies, which are making some inroads into a largely untapped market (Sander 2001). Informal means of transfer (e.g. sending money with relatives or returning with money to the home area) remain the most commonly used, especially for transfers of small amounts (but see also Box 5). It is worth noting that not just migrants, but also traders in rural areas, such as buyers of coffee, tea, tobacco, and other commodities, tend to have to carry money to pay for the goods at the farm gate or trading centre where they purchase.

It is equally important to pay attention to those in rural areas who are *not* receiving remittances, since they are likely to be the most vulnerable of all. One study of rural-urban migration has focused on the extreme poverty of women who are on their own, being divorced or widowed, who may be cut off from remittances previously provided by a partner, but unable to return to their natal home.

Clearly the presence of large numbers of refugees in Tanzania is also a matter of relevance to pro-poor policy. The coexistence of refugees and the host community in Western Tanzania has been a major issue, since the livelihoods of refugees and host communities interact, in both positive and negative ways for the refugee and host populations (Whitaker 1999). Although many in the Tanzanian government have highlighted negative effects, it is worth noting that there are opportunities for local entrepreneurs to exploit the cheap labour and captive market that the camp dwellers provide. Refugees may benefit from local employment, which supplements income and food supplies, whilst increased local economic activity is good for both refugees and locals.

However, within the host communities there are others who do not benefit, either because they lack the social or economic capital to take advantage of the rapid influx of investment and business

opportunities, or possibly because their own employment prospects are affected by refugees looking for work.

Tanzania is reported to be both a source and destination country for trafficked persons (USDOS 2003). Children are reportedly trafficked internally from rural to urban areas for domestic work, commercial agriculture, fishing, mining, and prostitution, with refugee children perhaps especially vulnerable to being trafficked to work on Tanzanian farms. To a lesser degree, Tanzania is also reported to be a destination country for trafficked persons from India and Kenya.

#### **4.2 International Migration and the 'Brain Drain'**

Unlike most other countries in this review, the 'brain drain' was not found to be a major issue within Tanzania.

#### **4.3 Migration Policies**

Policies on migration have been developed in several areas in Tanzania. First, as elsewhere in the continent, there has been some attempt to reduce rural-urban migration by focusing development initiatives on intermediate towns (Mbonile 1994b). However, although this has given rise to some development, it has not reduced the levels of migration to large urban centres. More generally, there is little attempt in public policy-making to address the issue of voluntary or economic migration; the Tanzania PRSP fails to mention migration at all.

In relation to forced migration, a contrast can be drawn between policies on 'trafficking' and on refugees. In relation to 'trafficking', the US reports that Tanzania does not fully comply with minimum standards to for the elimination of trafficking, although it is making significant efforts to do so (USDOS 2003). There is a multi-agency government task force working on child labour, including public awareness campaigns, whilst a section of the penal code was enacted in 2001 that criminalizes trafficking within or outside of Tanzania, although the penalty is seen as relatively light. During 2002, nightclubs were raided and 23 girls were repatriated to India for not having valid work permits. The owners were fined.<sup>11</sup> However, financial constraints, corruption and a 'poor understanding of the scope of the problem' have contributed to a lack of government activity in this area.

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<sup>11</sup> See <http://www.africahome.com/anews/categories/international/EpFllukZFFzgBLfoGP.shtml>

In contrast, Tanzania's refugee policy was for many years hailed as a model of progressive legislation by refugee lawyers, even if some parallels can be found between the country's openness to refugees, and its historic recruitment of labour from neighbouring countries to work in the plantation sector. However, following the crises in Rwanda and Burundi in the mid-1990s, there has been a significant change of government policy.

The 1998 Refugee Act tightened the decision making process to make it harder for asylum seekers to get refugee status, and reduced refugees' right to freedom of movement (Kamanga 2002). After large scale and largely forced repatriation of Rwandans in 1996, President Mkapa stated in May 2001 that all Burundian refugees should be repatriated at all costs, blaming the refugees for insecurity and the lack of development in western areas of Tanzania. Some repatriations to Burundi have occurred, although this continues to be problematic because of insecurity inside Burundi (Van Hoyweghen 2001).

#### **4.4 Key Issues and Policy Gaps**

As in other countries covered by this review, the significance of migration as a livelihood strategy remains a largely overlooked area for public policy in Tanzania. Although long abandoned as official government policy, the history of 'villagisation' programmes in the country arguably reinforced a mindset amongst policy makers that development was best promoted through interventions in rural areas that would reduce the need for migration. However, recent emphasis on decentralised development does recognise the need for rural people to have some level of mobility to smaller towns.

In addition, it is worth noting that Dar-es-Salaam has a longstanding reputation as a centre of learning for African professionals. Although this has declined somewhat in recent years in the face of economic decline, there is scope for Tanzania to promote mobility of professionals within the East African (or indeed sub-Saharan African) region, both to assist in the development of the city and its region, and to tackle the problem of 'brain drain' from the continent.

## 5 UGANDA

In the late-colonial and early independence period, Uganda attracted labour migration from neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and DRC to work on its plantations. However, with economic and political decline in the 1970s and 1980s, there was no longer any demand for immigrant labour and educated and professional Ugandans started to leave for neighbouring countries and the West, creating net out-migration. Since the late 1950s, Uganda has also received a large number of refugees from various crises and conflicts in the region, especially from DRC, Rwanda and Sudan.

There are no accurate figures on the number of Ugandans living outside Uganda: an anecdotal estimate suggests 500,000 emigrants, including refugees and migrants.<sup>12</sup> At the end of 2002, there were around 38,000 Ugandan refugees registered worldwide, the majority in DRC.<sup>13</sup> UNDESA figures suggest net emigration of 14,000 each year from 1995-2000 (UNDESA 2002), with this figure predicted to rise in 2000-05 (UNDESA 2000a). Only small numbers appear as new entrants in Europe or the US,<sup>14</sup> suggesting that most emigration is to other places, most likely other African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and Botswana.

In contrast, UNDESA figures suggest there were 529,000 immigrants in Uganda in 2000, representing 2.3 per cent of Uganda's population (UNDESA 2002b), although this is down from previous periods – it was estimated that in 1969, over 5 per cent of Uganda's total population were migrants, mostly other Africans.<sup>15</sup> At the end of 2002, just over 200,000 of these migrants were recognised refugees, although the real number of refugees and migrants is likely to be far greater. It is estimated that at least 50,000 refugees have self-settled and are not counted in these figures, whilst the Assistant Commissioner for Refugees has recently stated that Uganda hosts over 600,000 refugees alone, mainly from Sudan.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> This figure was recently quoted in Ugandan newspapers according to a source in DFID Kampala.

<sup>13</sup> Data from [www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)

<sup>14</sup> Eurostat figures give an average of 728 Ugandan immigrants into the EU each year from 1995-2001. US statistics give an average of 440 Ugandan immigrants accepted into the US per year in the period 1990-2002.

<sup>15</sup> Data from 1968 Uganda census cited by Russell et al. (1990).

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Michael Wafula, Assistant Commissioner for Refugees, Prime Minister's Office, 9<sup>th</sup> December 2003, reported in the *New Vision* newspaper.

This study has found no recent figures on internal labour migration in Uganda, although provisional data from the 2002 census is in the process of being published, and suggests that urbanisation has slowed considerably from 1991-2002. However, forced displacement has clearly increased in importance, with a report from September 2003 suggesting that the number of IDPs in Uganda had risen to over 1.4 million due to continued attacks in the North-West by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA).<sup>17</sup> Since the 1990s, LRA attacks have caused periodic displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The government has moved much of the population into 'protected villages', a controversial move which has unfortunately not been able to guarantee the protection of IDPs who suffer periodic attacks and daily violence.<sup>18</sup>

Another area of internal displacement has been the Rwenzori mountains in the West, as a result of attacks by the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), although security has now improved and people are returning, whilst in Eastern Uganda, thousands have been displaced by violent raids by Karamojong pastoralists.<sup>19</sup>

### 5.1 Importance of Migration to the Poor

Despite a lack of data on the movement of Ugandans either internally or abroad, it is striking that the most recent IMF figures for official remittances put the country in the top 20 countries worldwide in terms of the size of remittances proportional to GDP (Ratha 2003). Thus in 2001, the figure was estimated at \$483 million, without counting informal remittances. This represents some 8.5 per cent of GDP, or nearly \$20 per capita per annum, a sum that is higher than total foreign exchange earnings from coffee exports. An even higher figure of \$600 million was quoted in a recent speech by the Minister of Internal Affairs of Uganda (UNAAnet 2004). DFID Kampala reports that the newspapers have given a lot of attention to these figures in the last year.

Some caution is needed with respect to these figures. First, the \$483 million figure is composed of \$283 million in private remittances and \$128 million in NGO inflows, which are not obviously a result of migration. Second, DFID Uganda points out that these inflows were partly offset by private outflows of \$190 million in the year, leaving net private remittances of just \$94 million. Nonetheless,

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<sup>17</sup> See <http://www.idproject.org/countries/uganda/Uganda.htm>

<sup>18</sup> See <http://www.db.idproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/UgandaProfile+Summary>

<sup>19</sup> See <http://www.db.idproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/UgandaProfile+Summary>

a recent study of remittance behaviour has also looked at how people transfer money, finding that informal transfers via friends and family were most common, especially as many formal mechanisms were geographically or financially inaccessible to most people. This would suggest that official remittance figures might still understate their total value.

A number of new innovative mechanisms to transfer money are also worth highlighting. People wishing to send smaller amounts often use courier companies such as Elma Express and Yellow Pages, which have offices in most districts of Uganda. Users include internal migrants sending remittances and school fees to their families, and there is no limit on the amount that can be sent. A microfinance provider, Uganda Microfinance Union (UMU) has introduced a pilot money transfer product in one of its branches in 2001 and seems to have been successful so far in attracting clients, although currently these tend to be larger corporations and franchises as the fees remain high.

Remittances from migrants are clearly important for the poor, but they do not necessarily reach them. A recent study of livelihood strategies in Mbale, Kamuli and Mubende Districts (Dolan 2002) compared female and male-headed households, finding a greater number of economically active adults migrated from the former than the latter. This affected male sons in particular. However, although remittances were found to play an essential role in female headed households, this did not translate into enhanced income diversification, since off-farm opportunities for women were more circumscribed than for men.

There is also some evidence in Uganda of the association between HIV/AIDS and migration. Thus a longitudinal cohort study in a rural county of Masaka District found age and sex-standardised seroprevalence rates were 7.9 per cent overall, but just 5.5 per cent for adults who had not moved home, 8.2 per cent for adults who had moved within the village, 12.4 per cent for those who had moved to the neighbouring village, 11.5 per cent for those who had left the area, and 16.3 per cent for those who had joined the study area (Nunn et al. 1995). The reported number of lifetime sexual partners was higher for individuals who had changed residence.

A study on the livelihoods of self-settled urban refugees in Uganda suggests that despite some obstacles, many refugees possess skills, have been able to find employment and have either

achieved self-sufficiency or are on the way to doing so (Macchiavello 2003). The study therefore questions the policy of confining refugees to settlement camps where they cannot use their skills productively for themselves or the economy.

There are problems of internal and international trafficking (mainly to Sudan) of women and children, especially for labour and prostitution. In particular, the rebel group LRA has abducted tens of thousands of adults and children and forced them to become domestics, sex slaves or rebel soldiers.

## 5.2 International Migration and the 'Brain Drain'

Uganda was one of the first countries in Africa to lose a significant proportion of its highly skilled population, mainly in response to economic and political decline in the 1970s and 1980s (Adepoju 1994). Education had expanded quickly in Uganda after independence and its schools and universities produced relatively highly skilled people, who then could not find jobs. The main professionals leaving since the 1970s have been doctors, nurses, teachers/lecturers, engineers and scientists. Uganda was reported to have lost more than half its high level and professional or technical manpower during Amin's rule from 1971-1979 (Russell et al. 1990).

The first destinations were Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa, then Botswana and other African countries. A study from the 1980s found that Ghanaian and Ugandan nationals constituted 60 per cent of highly skilled migration into South Africa from East and West Africa at the time (Adepoju 1991). Another survey suggested net out-migration rates of up to 75,000 Ugandan nationals per year in the mid-1980s, of whom a high proportion were highly skilled and professional migrants (Russell et al. 1990). An IMF study based on the 1990 US census shows 5,000 individuals born in Uganda living in the US, of whom nearly 4,000 were tertiary educated (Carrington and Detragiache 1998). This was calculated to represent around 15 per cent of all those who had gained a tertiary education in Uganda.

One more recent study suggests that the exodus of skilled professionals has continued, although possibly at a lower rate. Thus an attempt to trace university graduates and secondary school leavers identified 414 graduates from four cohorts, of whom 321 were still in Uganda, 50 were deceased and 43 were overseas in late 2001 (Kumira and Vateganya 2003). This suggests a

slightly lower level of international migration among graduates, although one in five graduates from 1980 was living outside Uganda in 2001, whilst of the 1999 graduates, 8 per cent were already living overseas in 2001. Male graduates were three times more likely to emigrate than female graduates.

The latter study is of particular interest, since it looks at cohorts of school leavers, and factors in where they obtained any higher education. Here, it is interesting to note a decline in higher education overseas, perhaps reflecting declining opportunities. Thus whereas 42 per cent of 1980 school leavers had gone on to higher education overseas, this figure had declined to 23 per cent in 1994 and just 13 per cent in 1999. However, the proportion of women going overseas for higher education had risen slightly over this period.

### 5.3 Migration Policies

In line with most other countries surveyed in this report, policy on migration in Uganda is broadly orientated towards international migration. Historically, this has involved measures to limit both emigration and immigration. In the late 1980s, Uganda instituted measures to restrict emigration of professionals and civil servants through the imposition of foreign exchange restrictions and obligatory clearance for travel abroad (Russell et al. 1990, Adepoju 1991). In 1990, the Government reported that it considered emigration levels to be too high and said it would take measures to reduce emigration. However, by 2000, the Government described emigration levels as 'satisfactory' and had moved to a policy of 'no intervention' (UNDESA 2002b).

On return, Uganda has participated in the IOM's Return of African Qualified Nationals Programme (RAQN), which has successfully returned Ugandans from the UK, India, Canada and US. Like other countries in SSA, it has more recently turned its attention to mobilising the diaspora without necessarily promoting return (e.g. government speakers have attended meetings of the Uganda North American Association to raise awareness of development objectives in Uganda<sup>20</sup>). A number of other Ugandan groups in the diaspora have also focused on development issues, such as a variety of Buganda organisations mainly in North America, but also in Sweden<sup>21</sup>, and an Acholi

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<sup>20</sup> See [www.unaaboston.com/](http://www.unaaboston.com/) for the latest conference in Boston in August-September 2003. The 2004 meeting will be held in Seattle.

<sup>21</sup> See <http://www.buganda.com/diaspora.htm>

organisation (Kacoke Madit) established by Acholi communities in the diaspora to promote conflict resolution initiatives in northern Uganda.<sup>22</sup>

Uganda has signed and ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees, the 1967 protocol and ILO Convention 182 on Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour. Uganda was also one of the first signatories of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and acceded in 1995. It has not signed ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment, but it has launched a programme with the ILO to combat the worst forms of child labour including participating in the ILO regional programme to combat child labour in the commercial agricultural sector.

However, the legislative framework on child labour is quite weak and prosecution low, whilst overall, there remains limited institutional capacity on migration. Sections of the government involved in migration policy include the Immigration Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (immigration 'facilitation', monitoring and control), the Population Secretariat in the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Planning (population policy, programmes and research), and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (national migration statistics). The 1995 Constitution also stipulates the establishment of a National Citizenship and Immigration Board, although we have found no evidence of its existence or work. In addition, Makerere University hosts the Refugee Law Project and other institutions do limited work on migration, such as the Centre for Basic Research and the Makerere Institute for Social Research.

Uganda's refugee policy is still guided by the outdated 1960 Control of Aliens Act, which has been criticised for its inconsistency with international refugee law especially as regards the rights of refugees to own property, have access to courts and enjoy freedom of movement. However, Uganda has been discussing a new refugee law for some years and in December 2003, it was approved by the Cabinet and will now pass to Parliament in 2004. This aims to integrate refugee services within district development plans recognising that refugees and local communities share services. Thus Self Reliance Strategies (SRS) will be introduced for this purpose to avoid the establishment of parallel structures and 'foster the capacity of refugees to sustain themselves by

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<sup>22</sup> Kacoke Madit Peace and Reconciliation Project for northern Uganda is funded by DFID East Africa and FCO.

allowing them to cultivate land, grow crops and to generate food and income in order to make them self-reliant.', although this has been criticised for concentrating almost entirely on the integration of service provision and not wider economic and social integration.

The protection of refugees and especially IDPs in Uganda is a pressing problem. Every month there are abductions and killings in IDP camps in the northwest and the government's policy of grouping the population in camps does not seem to be offering any protection. On occasion the government has been accused of forcibly removing refugees from Uganda.

The Uganda PRSP (or PEAP) does not mention migration or refugee issues, nor do the 2001 and 2002 APRs. However, the 2003 APR does mention the issue of refugees in Uganda, commenting on the high numbers of poor rural refugees and their impacts on the social and economic development of local/host populations.<sup>23</sup> These are mainly expressed in negative terms such as potential environmental damage (depletion, degradation of natural resources, scarcity of water), stretching of social amenities and food shortages.

However, the APR also mentions possible positive effects of refugee presence including that international assistance to refugees may bring new services and infrastructure if properly planned and thus help development of the host region. The presence of refugees may also spark economic development if it brings additional market outlets, economic opportunities and innovative skills and practices.

In contrast to the PRSP, Uganda's latest Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) in 2000 does have a short discussion of migration as an economic or coping strategy. Noting that people migrate because of insecurity, to search for livelihood opportunities or seasonal water for animals, or to seek better services, it suggests that migrants find life hard but may succeed. Migrant men are described as often living in sub-standard accommodation and eating modestly, but being respected in their communities of origin where they are seen as better off. In addition to migration from all districts to Kampala, rural-rural migration is also noted from Kalangala, Kapchorwa, Kisoro, Kabarole and Bushenyi districts.

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<sup>23</sup> Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda Poverty Status Report 2003

### **Box 6: Turnaround of Policy on Emigration**

The extent of the turnaround in policy on emigration from Uganda is quite substantial, and according to recent articles in the *New Vision* and *Monitor* newspapers, reflects the new goal of the Ugandan Government to develop the potential economic contribution of the diaspora, rather than encouraging them not to leave.

For example, the liberalisation of financial markets, especially trade in foreign exchange, and the granting of permission for foreign denominated bank accounts, are said to have increased remittances. The Bank of Uganda Forex and Trade Department is now generally supportive and positively inclined towards granting permission to Money Transfer Organisations (MTOs).

There is also some interest in using Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) as providers of money transfer services. For example, the Centenary Rural Development Bank, a microfinance bank, represents one of the global MTOs, Western Union, as a sub-agent to a commercial bank, Nile Bank. An interviewee in DFID Kampala suggested the government now actually supports people going abroad to gain experience and has been engaged in training in this respect.

*Source:* DFID Uganda

However, although remittances are seen as playing an important part in rural people's lives, with receipt of cash from children in the city as an important means of survival for many elderly people, they are also described as a 'vulnerable source of income'. Migration of relatives to Kampala is seen as placing an initial strain on household resources.

DFID Uganda reports that media coverage of migration is mainly of refugees in Uganda and return programmes, with more recent reporting on the Uganda diaspora and the level of remittances. The latter has tended to be tongue-in-cheek or broadly positive.

## **5.4 Key Issues and Policy Gaps**

At present, the Ugandan government's capacity on migration issues seems to be almost wholly focused on immigration controls and statistics. There is a need to engage in capacity building so that the government can also examine migration and development issues and develop strategies. In particular, there is very little hard data or knowledge on the levels, nature and implications of internal migration in Uganda and the links between migration and livelihoods. The lack of reliable estimates of the numbers, location and status of Ugandans abroad may also be an impediment to programmes to engage the diaspora in Uganda's development. There is also a particular need to collect more information on self-settled refugees.

It would be useful to find out more details, and support Ugandan government initiatives to develop the economic contribution of the diaspora. There is particular potential to build on new mechanisms

for money transfer in Uganda such as courier companies and microfinance institutions to increase the possibilities of safe, cost-effective money transfer for internal and international migrants. More research on the links between migration and development might also help the government to develop a better understanding of the importance and risks of migration for the poor and develop strategies that can be integrated into the PRSP and rural development plans. In addition:

- Further research on brain drain could also be done to get more accurate figures and details of the professions and destinations of those leaving. Uganda could learn from other countries that have put in place policies on brain drain, such as enhancing training and facilitating return.
- Uganda still hosts significant numbers of refugees and needs continuing support in this respect. In particular, there are a large number of self-settled refugees about whom less is known. The Refugee Law Project at Makerere University has been working with this latter group and its research could be used to better inform policy.
- The levels of internal displacement and attacks on IDPs have now reached very high levels and there is an urgent need to find solutions to the conflict situation in the region, and in the meantime to investigate better protection measures for IDPs.
- Finally, there is a need for more research and understanding of the problems of trafficking and exploitation of women and children in Uganda and a more comprehensive government strategy, which prioritises protection and rights. There is also a need for Uganda to develop specific anti-trafficking legislation.

## 6 RWANDA

There has been significant movement within, from and to Rwanda over past decades, especially forced migration due to conflict and famine. Labour migration, notably to the mines of DRC and plantations of Uganda, was important in the colonial and post-colonial period. Due to the complexities and scale of these historical population movements and a lack of statistics, it is difficult to obtain accurate figures on the current numbers of Rwandan nationals living outside Rwanda.

A recent website established by the Rwandan government<sup>24</sup> estimates that there are more than 100,000 economically productive Rwandans outside the country, but this is widely thought to be an

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<sup>24</sup> The Rwanda Diaspora Global Network [www.rwandadiaspora.org](http://www.rwandadiaspora.org)

underestimate. Rwanda Information Exchange<sup>25</sup> has previously given a figure of 300,000 and in an interview with the Director of Immigration of the Government, he suggested the figure could be as high as 600,000.

As is the case with all such migration statistics, the problem is compounded by questions over whom to count. There are officially registered refugees and migrants, unregistered and self-settled refugees and migrants, asylum seekers, the children of Rwandan refugees or migrants born elsewhere, as well as those who are naturalised but consider themselves Rwandan and still maintain links. One author estimates that there were 3.7 million people of Rwandan origin living in neighbouring countries – principally Zaire – in 1990, over and above official refugee figures (Ngendakumana 1991).

UNDESA figures show huge inflows and outflows for Rwanda over the last decade, but this reflects the war, genocide and mass returns from 1994-98, and tells us little about underlying population movements.<sup>26</sup> In contrast, Eurostat figures show that an average of just 694 Rwandan immigrants entered the EU each year from 1995-2001. According to UNHCR, there were 75,000 Rwandan refugees and asylum seekers worldwide at the end of 2002, the majority in African countries – especially DRC and Uganda – with about 10,000 Rwandan refugees in OECD countries.

In terms of inflows, UNDESA figures gave a migrant stock of 89,000 in 2000, representing 1.2 per cent of Rwanda's population (UNDESA 2002a). At the end of 2002, there were just under 35,000 refugees, almost all from the DRC.<sup>27</sup> Unlike most neighbouring countries, internal migration rates appear to be low. Household surveys in 2000-01 revealed only 9 per cent of the population were living outside their province of birth (684,000 people). Kigali is the main destination, accounting for 37 per cent of internal migration (MFEP 2002).

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<sup>25</sup> See [www.rwanda.net](http://www.rwanda.net)

<sup>26</sup> The *International Migration Report 2002* suggests an average net emigration of 343,000 each year from 1990-95, and a net immigration of 395,000 from 1996-2000. However, this reflects the departure of an estimated 1.7 million after the genocide in 1994, the return of an estimated 800,000 'old caseload' refugees from 1959 onwards who returned at that time, and the gradually return of 'new caseload' refugees from 1995 onwards.

<sup>27</sup> Data from [www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)

Rwanda has not only produced large numbers of refugees, but also up to 650,000 IDPs at the peak of internal displacement in 1998.<sup>28</sup> Officially there are no longer any IDPs in Rwanda as they have been resettled. However, in October 2001, a multi-agency mission including UN, donor and Rwandan government representatives found there were still some 192,000 people living in IDP-like conditions, and it seems unlikely that this number has since decreased.

There are also problems of internal and international trafficking of women and children, especially for labour and prostitution (USDOS 2003). There are an estimated 2,000 child prostitutes in Rwanda, and tens of thousands of street children exploited for labour, plus some abductions by rebel militia. The government has been recently criticised for forcible round-ups of street children and their internment in centres where they are fed and receive training, but have no liberty.

### 6.1 Importance of Migration to the Poor

Compared with other African countries, rates of internal migration in Rwanda are low. This is related to the nature of Rwanda's geography and rural economy, but also to past political controls on internal movement, which made it difficult for people to move especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although there is no policy of control in place at present, there are still some reports of the authorities creating obstacles to movement and of problems in receiving communities.

Reflecting this lack of internal movement, there are virtually no studies in Rwanda of the links between migration, poverty and livelihoods, the importance of remittances, or their intergenerational impacts. Anecdotal evidence from NGOs suggest the causes of migration include periodic or chronic food insecurity, land pressure due to population density and continuous division

#### Box 7: IDPs and Villagisation in Rwanda

Estimates of the number of IDPs in Rwanda are controversial partly due to the Rwandan government's National Habitat Policy of villagisation (*imidugudu*). This policy was launched in 1996, both to solve acute housing needs of returnees and as a rural development strategy. However, from 1996-2000, there was some evidence of forcible movement of people into such planned villages.

Accusations of forced movement to planned villages have subsided since 2000, but the policy of villagisation remains and there are questions about whether this programme will be forced or voluntary in the future. Furthermore, the key element of Rwanda's draft land policy is land consolidation. If this is implemented, it may result in a far larger landless class, demand for labour on small plantations and an increase in internal migration.

*Source:* Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen (2000)

<sup>28</sup> See <http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Rwanda>

of household land and the chance of better employment, education and training opportunities. There is also some evidence from food security surveys of significant periodic and seasonal movement due to periodic or chronic food insecurity (WFP 2004).

Chronic food insecurity in a N-S band west of Kigali (especially parts of Gikongoro, Butare and Gitarama) appears to have caused migration eastwards, and to provincial towns. At the present time, failed crops in Kigali-Ngali and parts of Kibungo have also caused fairly significant movement to Umutara and Kigali, whilst there are likely to be some migrant labourers working in the tea plantations of Butare and Gikongoro. There also appears to be a recent growth in rural-urban migration, focused almost entirely on Kigali. Although urbanisation remains low in Rwanda at around 10 per cent, the government's 2020 Vision Strategy anticipates that this will rise to 30 per cent by 2020 (Govt. of Rwanda 1998).

IMF figures on international remittances are also sketchy and incomplete, suggesting just \$31 million between 1990-99, or just one per cent of all resource flows to the country. The Rwandan Ministry of Finance has however reported a figure of \$40 million in official remittances for 2001 alone, and admits this is likely to be a significant underestimate.

## 6.2 International Migration and the 'Brain Drain'

The limited figures that exist suggest that levels of emigration of tertiary educated and professionals are also currently relatively low for Rwanda.<sup>29</sup> This may reflect the relatively low past level of tertiary level training in Rwanda, although now with the government promoting higher education especially in sectors such as ICT, business administration and management, rates of emigration may increase.

However, as noted above, there may be quite a substantial Rwandan diaspora, which certainly includes a large number of the intelligentsia and professional classes under the old regime. One relevant factor is that this group is very politically active. There are a number of opposition parties and platforms based in Europe and North America including INHANGO and CPODR (*Concertation Permanente de l'Opposition Democratique Rwandaise*) and the head of the banned MDR party,

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<sup>29</sup> An IMF study based on 1990 US census figures suggests just 2.2 per cent of tertiary-educated Rwandans were in the US. See Carrington and Detragiache (1998).

Faustin Twagiramungu remains in exile in Belgium. In the absence of strong opposition inside Rwanda<sup>30</sup>, these exiled opposition parties in some ways represent an alternative political voice (not all are extremists). Some have a large following amongst the diaspora, but it is not clear what support they enjoy amongst the population inside Rwanda.

### 6.3 Migration Policies

The parts of the Rwandan government involved in migration issues and policy include:

- *General Direction for Immigration and Emigration* in the National Security Office: Focus is currently on immigration controls, although there are plans to make it a Migration Department with a mandate to oversee migration policy and strategy.
- *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*: Oversees issues to do with Rwandan refugees and migrants overseas and has a new diaspora and development desk. Looks after the Rwandan Global Diaspora Network.
- *Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning*: Oversees remittance issues.
- *Ministry of Education*: Nominal brief on brain drain, but nothing done until now.
- *National Statistics Office*: Monitors national migration statistics, but for now limited to census results.
- *National Refugee Council*: Established two years ago to oversee asylum cases and draw up a new immigration and asylum law.

In 2001, the government launched the Rwanda Global Diaspora Network (RGDN). One of the aims of this network is to establish a Diaspora Investment Bank, to try to promote the productive investments and savings of the diaspora. The launch took place at the First Rwandan Diaspora Global Convention, held in Kigali in December 2001. There were 385 representatives from the Rwanda diaspora in 32 countries. Although this is an excellent initiative, it should be noted that reporting on other Rwandan websites at the time (not pro-government) were critical and said that those members of the diaspora who went were hand-picked and the government failed to attract many Hutus.

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<sup>30</sup> There are reports of the dismantling of the opposition before the 2003 elections including the banning of the MDR on the grounds of "divisionism", a number of imprisonments and disappearances, and flight of people critical to the regime. See International Crisis Group (2002).

**Box 8: Regional Migration Arrangements**

A question for the future is whether or not Rwanda will join the East Africa Community (EAC) with Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya and thus, whether or not the proposed provisions on free movement of skilled or all labour will become a reality. Rwanda applied a few years ago and its application was refused the first time. However, the application is still on the table and the EAC has promised to consider the issue of new members later this year once the EAC customs union is operational after March.

In the past, Rwanda was part of CEPGL (*Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs*), which was established in 1976 by Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi. In 1985 CEPGL adopted a convention on the free movement of persons, goods and services, capital and rights of establishment in member countries. However, low prevailing skill levels kept movement of high-level power among these countries to a minimum (unlike Uganda with its good quality higher education, Rwanda and Burundi have tended to rely on institutions in the US, Europe and Russia for university education) and these protocols were never properly translated into national legislation. Furthermore, since the 1990s, conflict in the Great Lakes region led to the breakdown of CEPGL. At present there is little likelihood that it will be revived in the near future

*Source: Ricca (1989) cited in Adepoju (1991)*

In relation to emigration, the Director for Immigration and Emigration reports that nothing is done to stop movement abroad, except that the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) has recently changed its policy on overseas scholarships to try to encourage students to return to Rwanda afterwards. There are some initiatives to promote return of Rwandans from abroad. As well as the UNHCR voluntary return agreements, one aim of the RGDN is to engage diaspora skills and knowledge to contribute to Rwanda's development. Rwanda is currently in discussions with IOM about a possible return scheme, and also with UNDP, which is launching a TOKTEN programme that aims to bring back short-term volunteers in engineering, medicine, and education. This will focus on attracting qualified expatriate nationals as short-term volunteers, and the US\$5 million project has been designed with MINEDUC (Ministry of Education) and the Human Resource Development Agency (HRDA). DFID is considering giving some funding.

Rwanda has signed and ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees and 1967 protocol and ILO Convention 182 on Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour. It has also recently signed Protocols of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime including on Trafficking. It has not signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

Rwanda does not currently have an immigration and asylum policy. In the aftermath of the genocide, UNHCR handled these issues, but in 2001 Rwanda set up a National Refugee Council to

rule on claims on a case by case basis and to develop a new immigration and asylum law. The draft law should go Parliament this year.

Overall, Rwanda does not currently have explicit migration policies or activities in other areas such as migrant protection or trafficking, nor is there currently huge press attention to the issue. The PRSP makes a passing mention to the reintegration challenges since 1994 but does not specifically mention migration, whilst the PPA makes no mention of migration issues at all. The Rwandan media gives regular coverage to refugee issues, especially about returning refugees and the government's refugee repatriation programme, but otherwise, there are hardly any reports about migration, aside from occasional reporting about migrants from neighbouring countries who live and work illegally in Rwanda. Finally, Vision 2020 sets out some of the broad lines of the strategies of villagisation, land consolidation, urbanisation and decentralisation.

#### **6.4 Key Issues and Policy Gaps**

The Rwandan government has faced many challenges since 1994 and developing policies and strategies on migration issues has clearly not been a major priority. However, it does now appear to recognise that it needs to look at these issues and develop clear strategies.

A first priority appears to be the finalisation of the immigration and asylum law in accordance with international standards. Research is needed on the links between migration and development such that migration issues can be integrated into the PRSP and rural development strategies as necessary. There is some concern within government about the current concentration of rural-urban migration on Kigali and policy is seeking to focus some urbanisation of the other 12 main municipalities.

A number of other areas can be highlighted where further work would be helpful:

- It would be useful to understand whether there are de facto bureaucratic controls on population movement, whilst research on remittances in Rwanda – internal and international – including on the levels of formal and informal remittances, remittance behaviour and possible schemes to promote productive use of remittances would also be of value.
- Although brain drain does not currently seem to be a problem, it may become an issue in the future and the government could usefully learn from the experiences of other countries in

putting in place policies to enhance the positive effects and minimise the negative effects of educated and professionals leaving.

- The TOKTEN and IOM programmes should be encouraged and supported as a way to engage the diaspora productively and also increase confidence about long-term return, whilst an attempt should be made to better understand the transnational activities of the diaspora and their impacts in Rwanda.
- Underpinning some of the existing policy gaps is the lack of reliable estimates of the numbers, location and status of Rwandans abroad, and of the scale and nature of internal movements. Indeed, given the massive inflows and outflows due to the conflict and genocide, and the lack of statistics, it is hard to get an idea of the levels of voluntary or labour migration of Rwandans, whether internally or internationally. The government is aware that this is an important issue and would like to commission some research in this area.
- Rwanda needs to develop its capacity to collect and monitor both international and internal migration statistics with the cooperation of destination countries. There is a need to continue to monitor the flow of asylum seekers out of Rwanda even if the numbers are limited. The majority of the real political opposition is in exile and some of those who continue to leave cite the tight political control and inability to criticise the government. Refugee flows and returns may be a good barometer of the political environment.
- There is also a need to monitor the situation of Rwandan refugees to ensure they are being accorded adequate protection in their countries of asylum and that return programmes are voluntary. The cases of the thousands of unregistered or self-settled refugees in Uganda and DRC are particularly challenging as these refugees lack status and protection.
- The future implementation of Rwanda's Habitat and Land policies is intended to promote the movement of the population to villages and cities and the consolidation of agricultural land. This will need monitoring closely to ensure movements are voluntary. Also, if implemented these policies may well provoke an increase in internal migration.
- Finally, there is a need for more research and understanding of the problems of trafficking and exploitation of women and children in Rwanda and a more comprehensive government strategy which prioritises protection and rights.

## CONCLUSIONS

There are relatively rich empirical studies of the impact of migration on poverty and poor people in East Africa, and can contribute to understanding how pro-poor policy can take migration into account. Yet despite this empirical knowledge base, and attempts to foster regional integration, attitudes towards both migration and refugee flows appear sceptical at least, and appears to have hardened in recent years.

Labour circulation forms a particularly important part of migration within East Africa, although the region has also witnessed substantial movements of refugees and internally-displaced people, which have affected virtually every country in the region. In particular, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda all remain host to substantial refugee populations. In contrast, international migration is relatively weak in the region, with the exception of the Horn of Africa, which has seen substantial movement to the US (from Ethiopia and Somalia), Europe (from Somalia) and the Middle East (from Somalia and Sudan).

A range of innovative informal remittance systems have developed across the region to facilitate especially intra-country flows through bus and courier companies, and in the case of Somalia, substantial flows from overseas. However, there is some evidence that trust in internal remittance systems at least is eroding, whilst Somali money transfer agencies have raised some regulatory concerns.

Dealing with forced displacement continues to be an important issue in the region, and recent regional initiatives have focused on developing a regional framework for refugee protection. There is considerable scope to facilitate regional networks to support such initiatives with evidence-based policy proposals, linking university-based centres dealing with forced migration in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia. It is not unreasonable to expect that the return of refugees and IDPs will gain increasing importance in the coming years, and there is potential to facilitate the development of a regional policy framework to address this shift.

EAC has recently introduced new 'East African passports' and temporary passes to speed up movement between countries in the region, as well as a range of other initiatives to promote greater regional integration.

Although migration to Europe and North America is less significant in much of East Africa than elsewhere on the continent, the governments of Uganda and Rwanda in particular have recently shown interest in promoting links with diaspora groups.

IOM's MIDA project has also made greater strides in East Africa than elsewhere in the continent, with one initiative aiming to build the capacity of the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to provide protection to their citizens working abroad and to expand legal labour migration opportunities for the benefit and development of their countries of origin. This could also benefit from DFID support and interest.

In relation to migration of the poor, DFID policy could build on knowledge about the transfer mechanisms and uses of remittances to support community-based credit, savings, transfer and investment initiatives. Effective regulation to build trust needs to be balanced with keeping costs low and avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy.

## Appendix 1: Historical Overviews of Migration in Selected Countries

<b>UGANDA: MAIN HISTORICAL MIGRATION TRENDS</b>	
<u>1895-1914:</u>	An estimated 37,500 Asians, mainly Indians brought into Uganda by the British Colonial Administration to work on the railroads.
<u>1910s/1950s:</u>	Asians continue to arrive in Uganda and set up trading and processing businesses. By 1939, there were an estimated 17,300 Asians in Uganda; by 1962, there were 77,400.
<u>1950s/60s:</u>	Labour in-migration from neighbouring countries (especially Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi) to work on Uganda's cotton and coffee plantations.
<u>1959-61 &amp; 1963-64:</u>	First waves of Rwanda Tutsi refugees arrive in Uganda fleeing violence in Rwanda.
<u>1969:</u>	National census puts total immigrant population in Uganda at 5.68% (of which Africans 5.1%)
<u>1972:</u>	An estimated 55,000 Asians and British of non-Ugandan citizenship expelled from Uganda following the coming to power of Idi Amin in 1971.
<u>1979:</u>	Mass exodus from the then West Nile province to Zaire (150,000 in 1980) and Sudan (39,000), mainly from ethnic groups that had supported Amin and Amin fell in 1979. Some returned in 1980.
<u>1970s:</u>	Arrival of more Rwandan and Zairean refugees. By 1981, there were an estimated 80,000 Rwandan and 32,000 Zairean refugees were in Uganda.
<u>1970s/80s:</u>	With economic decline in the 1970s/early 1980s due to economic mismanagement and impacts of global recession, many industries and businesses closed in Uganda and professional and skilled migrants start to leave mainly for Kenya and Tanzania, but later for other parts of Africa, North America and Europe.
<u>Post-1986:</u>	Large-scale return of Ugandans following the defeat of Obote by the National Resistance Army and coming to power of Museveni - especially to Arua and Moyo districts.
<u>1990:</u>	More Sudanese refugees arrive in Uganda due to the insurgency in Southern Sudan.
<u>1994:</u>	Many Rwandan refugees return to Rwanda after three decades in exile in Uganda.
<u>mid-1990s-present:</u>	Large numbers of people displaced in the northwestern districts of Gulu and Kitgum/Pader as a result of attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army. In May 2003, there were an estimated 830,000 IDPs in Uganda.
<i>Sources: Oucho 1995, Stanton Russell et al 1990, UNHCR 2002, OCHA 2003, www.asiansfromuganda.org</i>	

**RWANDA: MAIN HISTORICAL MIGRATION TRENDS**

<u>Late 1920s:</u>	An estimated 100,000 Rwandans pushed into Uganda and Congo (DRC) by famine (Pottier 2002).
<u>1918-1959:</u>	An unknown number of Rwandans leave to work in the mines of Belgian Congo (Zaire), the cotton plantations of East Africa and Burundi.
<u>1959-61:</u>	First major wave of Rwandan refugees, mainly Tutsi, flee to neighbouring Uganda, Congo and Burundi following the killings of Tutsi that accompanied the Hutu "revolution", the end of Tutsi monarchical rule and the transfer of power to the Hutu majority.
<u>1963-64:</u>	Some exiled refugees organise armed raids into Rwanda, each raid provoking more violence against Tutsi and further exodus, mainly to South Kivu in Congo. By 1964, UNCHR estimated that more than 150,000 Rwandans (mainly Tutsi) were living as refugees in neighbouring countries and a few (probably less than 2000) fled to Europe (Belgium).
<u>1967:</u>	Renewed killings, more Tutsi flee to neighbouring countries.
<u>1973:</u>	Purge of Tutsi from public posts by the Kayibanda regime in February and March 1973. Several hundred Tutsi were killed and a few thousand fled over the border.
<u>1970s/80s:</u>	An unknown number of Rwandans leave to work in Uganda's coffee plantations.
<u>Late 1980s:</u>	UNHCR makes little progress on solving the lingering problem of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees living outside the country. After several years of relative quiet, the Rwandan government initiates anti-Tutsi propaganda.
<u>1990:</u>	October 1 <sup>st</sup> , the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) of exiled Tutsis from Uganda invades Rwanda and the civil war begins, accompanied by increasing persecution, imprisonment and violence against Tutsis and leading more to flee, several to join the ranks of the RPF.
<u>1994:</u>	April to July: an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu are slaughtered. The fleeing former regime takes an estimated 1.7 million Rwandan Hutus with them into neighbouring Zaire (DRC) - an unknown number guilty of organisation of or participation in the genocide. They lived in refugee camps in Eastern Zaire for almost two years.
<u>1994-95:</u>	After the RPF took power in July 1994, an estimated 700,000 Tutsi refugees from as far back as 1959 returned to Rwanda, mainly from the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire, but also a few also from Europe and North America.
<u>1996:</u>	In August, the RPF attacks the camps in Eastern Zaire, aiming to break up the camps and stop them being used as a base to attack Rwanda. Several thousand refugees were killed and mass repatriation started voluntarily and by force.
<u>1996-1999:</u>	Several hundred thousand refugees repatriated from 1996 to 1999 (most in early 1997). Several thousands others head west further into Zaire instead and there is evidence that they were pursued by RPF soldiers and speculation that thousands of these refugees perished in the forests – one estimate says up to 200,000 "missing refugees" have not been accounted

<u>2002:</u>	for (Stockton 1996). UNHCR reports that almost 1.5 million Rwandan refugees have been repatriated from DRC (Zaire) to Rwanda since the start of their operations there in 1994 and around 20,000 refugees remain. <i>Sources:</i> UNHCR, Pottier (2002), Prunier (1995), International Crisis Group, Global IDP Project
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<b>TANZANIA: RECENT HISTORICAL MIGRATION TRENDS</b>	
<u>1962-1963:</u>	Rwandan Tutsis flee to Tanzania following independence
<u>1969:</u>	Villagisation begins as a voluntary programme, encouraged through the provision of social services, following 1967 Arusha Declaration and the concept of <i>ujamaa</i> (familyhood) which referred to 'socialism in the villages'.
<u>1972:</u>	Burundian refugees enter Tanzania fleeing ethnic massacres.
<u>1973:</u>	Nyerere decides villagisation is too slow and orders that everyone should live in a village. The military are involved in forced villagisation.
<u>1976:</u>	By 1976 the government claimed that 13 million Tanzanians (90% of rural population) had moved into villages. However other independent sources suggest that around 5 million had moved (Oxfam, 1999).
<u>1970s:</u>	Due to dissatisfaction with villagisation, many people moved to urban areas; Tanzania had one of the fastest urbanisation rates during this period.
<u>1988:</u>	Burundian Hutus flee ethnic massacres and enter Tanzania
<u>1993:</u>	Hutu refugees flee Burundi
<u>1994:</u>	More than 500,000 Hutu refugees flee from Rwanda to Tanzania, including 250,000 in 24 hours on April 28 <sup>th</sup> 1994. Interahamwe Militias routinely terrorise populations in the camps.
<u>1996:</u>	Tanzania begins the forced repatriation of Rwandan refugees, the Tanzanian Army, with the assistance of the UNHCR forcibly repatriate Rwandan refugees. On the 28 <sup>th</sup> December Tanzania declares the repatriation complete.
<u>1997-2004:</u>	Tanzanian government continues to expel Rwandan asylum seekers who have been refused asylum from the refugee camps in the west of the country.
<u>2002:</u>	UNHCR assists in voluntary return of 60,000 Burundian refugees to Northern provinces considered safe in 18 months from March 2002.
<u>2003:</u>	UNHCR criticises Tanzanian government for confining refugees to their camps in Western Tanzania, which prevents them engaging in agriculture and commerce in the surrounding area.
<u>2004:</u>	The government estimates that 320,000 Burundi refugees remain in Tanzanian camps, another estimated 470,000 Burundians, most of whom left Burundi in 1972, live outside the camps. Since 2001, approximately 168,000 refugees have returned to Burundi from Tanzania. Of these, some 70,000 have returned with UNHCR assistance since the agency began facilitating returns in 2002.
<i>Sources:</i> UNHCR, Oxfam, BBC News	

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