On Migration and the Policy Process\textsuperscript{1}

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# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Contexts</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Structures and Policy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Convergence or Divergence</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled and Unskilled Migration Policies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and Development</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNAL MIGRATION</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BACKGROUND

A complicating factor in any analysis of migration and policy is that virtually any policy can have some impact on the movement of people. Policies designed for some other specific purpose might have a profound influence on migration. Some of these impacts appear obvious even if the outcomes were not entirely foreseen. It would seem quite clear that policies to improve access to a particular region by extending the road network will have an effect on human mobility. For example, such an extension might ultimately lead to the depopulation of an area under certain circumstances or to a repopulation and resultant ethnic conflict between native and immigrant groups under other circumstances. Equally, the construction of a dam for water control will have fairly clear implications for migration: it might displace large numbers of long-established villagers while at the same time bringing into the area large numbers of construction workers on a temporary basis. However, the impact on migration of other policies such as trade policy or international agreements on trade might not be so obvious. The termination of the Multi Fibre Agreement at the end of 2004, for example, is likely to expose some textile-producing countries such as Bangladesh or South Africa to greater competition from more efficient producers such as China. Closure of factories is likely to have some impact on migration as some displaced workers return to their villages or seek to move overseas legally or illegally to continue some form of employment. The full impact of policies such as these on population movement is not well understood and it seems appropriate to suggest that a 'migration impact statement', similar to environmental impact statements, should be incorporated into most large-scale developments. The suggestion is not made simply to create yet another layer in the bureaucratic process but to make policy makers more sensitive to the fact that most development policies do have an impact on migration and that governments need to be forewarned what these might be so that they are able to take action appropriately.

Accepting that virtually any policy can have some impact on the movement of people, one can also recognize that a series of policies exist that have been developed specifically to deal with migration and migrants. This paper will be concerned primarily with these direct migration policies rather than with the overall impact that indirect policies may or may not have on migration. It might be hypothesized that indirect policies might have their greatest impact on internal migration but, given
close links between internal and international systems of mobility, such a conclusion might be too speculative. However, a difference between policies that are designed to deal with movement within the borders of a single country and those designed to 'manage', to use the current word of choice, migration into (or out of) a sovereign state can be sustained. Direct policies, too, can be identified for internal migration and these will be discussed after an assessment of those designed for international migration.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Policy Contexts

Direct policies to manage international migration can perhaps be conceptualized as falling into four overlapping clusters:

- Immigration and emigration
- Humanitarian
- Integration and assimilation
- Migration and development

The first three of these clusters are closely interrelated, more so than they are with policies on migration and development, even if synergies exist among them all. The immigration and emigration cluster encompasses policies designed to define who can enter or leave a country and how many can do so. Essentially, they create channels and define which categories of entrants are 'legal' and, hence, which are 'illegal', or again using the discourse of the day, 'irregular'. Humanitarian policies reflect a country's standing in the world and its acceptance of its moral responsibilities more than its need for immigrants. Nevertheless, those accepted under humanitarian categories may seek to have family members join them and humanitarian, immigration and integration policies begin to blend. The integration cluster is concerned with those policies that deal with migrants after they have arrived, looking after their welfare, and concerned with their education that may eventually create model citizens. Policies in these three clusters are implemented by and within a single country. Decisions who to admit and how to provide for those
admitted are, first and foremost, national concerns. Policies concerning migration and development on the other hand are bilateral or multilateral and something of an aberration in the ambit of migration policy. They have come to prominence in recent years and are related to the first three clusters to the extent that they are often designed, implicitly if not explicitly, to relieve pressure on the immigrant and humanitarian intake. By improving conditions in areas of origin of migration, migration out of that country might be expected to slow. That this is not the case may not be so intuitively obvious. Particular attention will be given to this cluster in further discussion below.

One aspect of migration policy that is often ignored but is a consequence of the multidimensional nature of the issue is the bureaucratic nature of the process. Rarely is migration policy the responsibility of a single government ministry or department. Thus, to speak of 'migration policy' as if it were a homogeneous and uncontested entity is deceptive: the temptation exists to essentialize it into unity, obscuring intrinsic tensions and contradictions. The four clusters identified above are usually reflected in different areas of governmental responsibility with different government ministries or departments competing for influence. In a democracy, the policies may change depending upon the influence of the minister in charge, and his or her relationship with the prime minister and the relative importance of the ministries in question. Immigration policies are rarely formulated with a view to their impact on potential countries of origin, thus creating tensions between departments with responsibility for development and those advocating particular types of immigration, for example. Departments attempting to develop education programmes or provide housing for new arrivals might not be aware of how policies on admissions are either being planned or implemented. 'Joined-up thinking' and 'synergies' are often part of the vocabulary of interdepartmental pleas for more integrated approaches to migration policy and often from weaker to stronger ministries.

State Structures and Policy

The root causes of migration may be economic, a result of relative inequalities in resource allocation or in the provision of subsistence, uneven development, or a struggle over resources, but factors regulating those flows are political, although not limited to direct policy implementation. Migration, it has been argued, can only be understood within some kind of political process
(Zolberg 1999). Thus, migration policy is likely to be related closely to the changing nature of the state. This statement does not imply that a unilinear system of parallel paths exists between the evolution of migration and the evolution of the state but simply that particular types of states are likely to be associated with particular regimes of population mobility. For example, the creation of the nation state has been associated with the production of refugees as those who did not fit the ideal of the 'nation' were expelled. From its initial formulation in Europe in the late seventeenth century it perhaps reached its apogee in the emergence of new states upon the retreat of colonialism following the Second World War (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989).

Whether transitions exist associated with long-term changes in the structure of states remains more problematic: whether the shifts from Kingly States to Territorial States, from State Nations to Nation States, or from the Modern State to the Market State (Bobbitt 2002) were associated with different forms of migration must be left for future research. In the burgeoning literature on migration and development, relatively little attention has focused on linkages between migration and political development (although for an early example, see Zolberg 1978). More recent research by Hollifield (2004b) has identified the emergence of the 'migration state'. The early nation states were essentially 'garrison states' but, with the industrial revolution, states became more dependent upon the exchange of goods and, in turn, became more open 'trading states'. Hollifield (2004b: 903) argues that, in the current context of globalization and increasing international trade, security and stability depend upon the capacity of states to manage migration in the context of some kind of multilateral regime. The migration state has to resolve what he terms the 'liberal paradox' or tensions between the economic pressure to open their borders to trade and domestic political pressures to close them.

With the triumph of the liberal parliamentary system of democracy over the forces of fascism in 1945, institutions were put in place to avoid the emergence of such a conflict again. While having their roots in the pre-Second World War period, both the United Nations at the international level and the welfare state at the national level (restricted mainly to the developed world) became critical institutions in the battles against poverty and inequality. These developments were incompatible with policies that maintained discrimination on the basis of race, and the civil rights movement in the United States was an integral part of the political shifts at this time. Of greatest relevance to
migration, however, was that the exclusionist policies based upon national origin pursued by the leading countries of immigration, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were also incompatible with this political ideology. From 1945, the restrictions on Asian migration to the United States began to be dismantled even if the full effect was not felt until the late 1960s in North America and a decade later in Australasia.

**Regional Convergence or Divergence**

It would be naïve, however, to see shifting migration policy simply as a response to changing political ideology. The underlying demography and economy had also shifted. Fertility in Europe, after an initial surge, declined markedly after the Second World War: after decades of stagnation, the post-war years brought a new prosperity to much of Western Europe. Within a generation, although emigration had not ceased, Europe had begun the shift from a region of mass net emigration to one of mass net immigration. The countries of immigration in North America and Australasia had to turn to new areas, primarily in Latin America and Asia, for sources of immigrants. The arrival of tens of thousands of new immigrants or workers of very different backgrounds from the majority of host populations raised serious policy issues throughout the developed world. Ireland and the New Commonwealth provided most of the labour for the post-war prosperity in the United Kingdom, even if the migrants were not brought in under labour contracts but through policies of unrestricted access to those from its near neighbour, colonies and the Commonwealth. The numbers of net immigrants from New Commonwealth countries fluctuated around 40,000 a year in the second half of the 1950s but rose to 136,400 in 1961 and restrictions were imposed from 1962 (Layton-Henry 2004: 302). The annual rate of immigration in France increased from around 32.5 per 1,000 around 1950 to 133.6 per 1,000 around 1970 when there were over 2 million foreigners in the country (Hollifield 2004a: 188). The numbers of guest workers in Germany increased from less than 300,000 in 1960 to 2.6 million in 1973 (Martin 2004a: 224-227).

respectively following the first ‘oil shock’. However, the demand for low-cost workers remained and any attempts to repatriate foreign workers or to restrict workers or migrants already in the country from bringing their families immediately encountered the rights legislation that was at the very heart of the modern European state. The situation amply demonstrated a ‘liberal paradox’ between any wish to restrict immigration in order to protect the perceived rights of citizens on the one hand and the rights of migrants on the other. However, immigration rates did slow significantly in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the new policies offering support to Zolberg’s (1999) view, derived from a detailed historical analysis of the case of the United States, that immigration policies can indeed influence the volume of flows (also Zolberg 2006).

Nevertheless, scholars of the recent immigration debate have identified an increasing gap between policy aims and policy outcomes (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004; also Castles 2004). The gap is attributed to the application of ‘policy instruments with inherent flaws that fail to deter unauthorized immigrants and asylum seekers but produce serious unintended consequences’ (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004: 7). They provide the temporary foreign worker programme as an example of a flawed instrument with unintended consequences. Those brought in under such programmes tend to stay on and attempt to bring in family members, often as illegal immigrants. Another example might be strict border surveillance that forces would-be immigrants to attempt crossings in more difficult and dangerous situations, leading to higher mortality and, once again, challenging the conscience of the liberal state. Increased surveillance might also have the unintended consequence of discouraging a return of irregular migrants to country of origin.

The growing gap between intention and outcome of migration control policy and the apparent ineffectiveness of recent policies to limit irregular migration has called some to abandon control altogether and move towards ‘open borders’ (Hayter 2000, Harriss 2002 but also in more nuanced ways in Legrain 2006 and Pritchett 2006). Any such move within a nation state framework in which the state is the principal provider both of security and welfare would seem unworkable as citizens as voters would perceive themselves prejudiced relative to outsiders, and vote the proposers of any such legislation out of office. This scenario is part of the liberal paradox where policies that perhaps seem to benefit the state are not seen to be in the best interests of individuals: one of the contradictions of the democratic state. However, if the structure of the state moves more towards a
market state in which private organizations increasingly take on the responsibility for the provision of health, education, housing and even security, a gradual shift towards more open borders would seem a logical development. Private companies operate transnationally and it can be envisioned that people will increasingly travel across borders for their education and provision of health care, and new identities and dependencies will emerge. Which way the state will evolve is, of course, unknown but the analysis of migration policy within changing state structures seems a fruitful research direction.

The vigour of the immigration debate can be seen from the above synopsis. There is as yet no clear consensus either on what works or, more theoretically, on linkages between state formation and migration policy. The discussion thus far has focused on the developed world of Europe and North America. When the states of Asia are included, further complications emerge. The strong rights orientation, in conjunction with systems of transparent government, is lacking in many of the countries in the Asian region. With the partial exceptions of Hong Kong and Singapore, no country in the region makes provision for the immigration of people for settlement, except for a tiny number of special cases. The former allows the immigration from Mainland China of a set number of family members of Hong Kong residents. Both Hong Kong and Singapore also grant residence status to a small number of others with special skills from China and elsewhere.

Yet, in East Asia, a migration paradox as contradictory as any in Europe has emerged. The rapid rates of economic growth have been accompanied by a sharp decline in fertility. The latter have been so pronounced that overall population growth rates have been reduced to very low levels and Japan has reached the point of negative growth. Rising education levels of the domestic populations, as well as increasing prosperity, have resulted in growing aspirations and it has become increasingly difficult to fill unskilled positions. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as Hong Kong and Singapore, have, like the countries in Southern Europe, shifted from being economies of emigration to economies of immigration. In 2004, official estimates placed the number of foreign workers in East Asian economies at somewhere around 3.75 million (Skeldon 2006b). Another 1.2 million irregular workers were probably in Malaysia alone. Even China, which clearly has some way to go before it moves into labour deficit at the national level, reported some 2 million job vacancies in its southern coastal regions in 2004.
The vast majority of foreign workers in East Asia are labour migrants on short-term contracts and the irregular migrants are clearly in an insecure, non-permanent situation. The central question is whether the gap between policy intention and outcome observed in the 'West' will also emerge in Asia. That is, will these temporary migrants become a permanent feature of Asian economies and then seek to bring their families to create the kinds of ethnically varied, multicultural societies that have emerged in the West? State structures in the East Asian economies are, however, distinct from those in the West. Nevertheless, those that have perhaps moved more towards democratic, parliamentary systems of government, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, are also among those where clear migration policies are being developed. However, only between 1 and 2 per cent of their populations are estimated to be foreign-born, well below those of Europe, North America and Australasia where proportions of 10 per cent or more are common (see United Nations 2006a). Japan and Korea are also looking towards their co-ethnics as a source of migrant labour: Japan among the Japanese of Brazil and Peru, and South Korea among the Koreans of China. Such policies, it is thought, will produce populations more acceptable to the hosts and easier to assimilate. Hence, such policies may provide an initial step towards a model of migrant settlement that will later be extended to recruitment from other sources if accepted by the host population.

Skilled and Unskilled Migration Policies

Whether, given their ageing populations, East Asian economies will proceed down the road towards the creation of permanent immigrant communities in the same way as Europe, or be able to sustain a long-term circulation of labour that will maintain migrant groups excluded from full participation in the host country will depend upon the direction of state development in Asia. Any moves towards more liberal systems will almost certainly see the emergence of permanent migrant communities. However, even in North America, Australasia and Europe, temporary migration programmes appear to be re-emerging as a realistic policy option in the context of ageing societies (see Martin 2004b, Ruhs 2005, Castles 2006). However, the recent proposals have to be seen within the context of the growing demand for skilled migrants.

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2 The rapid development of the East Asian economies has attracted back many skilled migrants who have either entered politics or the civil service. The role of migration in the democratization of countries is a theme that cannot be pursued here.
One of the few clear present trends in current attempts to 'manage' migration are policies to attract increased numbers of skilled migrants while attempting to limit the numbers of the unskilled. As early as 1967, Canada had introduced a points system as a basis for selecting those with the skills most needed nationally. This system was progressively modified to attract those with higher qualifications as well as businessmen and entrepreneurs. By the end of the century, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, among others in Europe, as well as Australia, New Zealand and the United States of those traditional countries of immigration, had all made provision to attract the highly skilled and a global competition for talent had emerged. However, it is not just the developed countries of the West that need skilled labour: the rapidly developing economies of East Asia, as well as nuclei of dynamism throughout the developing world, are rarely self-sufficient in the skills they need.

However, skilled migration systems are not independent of unskilled systems. Skilled migrants create unskilled jobs. Skilled IT engineers require packers, transporters and shippers of the hardware and software they create. Bankers and other financial experts require office cleaners, restaurateurs and valets. While developed countries might wish to attract skilled workers and integrate them as citizens and keep the unskilled out, such a strategy is unrealistic. Within Europe, certain countries, including the United Kingdom, see the solution to the supply of the unskilled to lie in the countries of new accession to the European Union. This policy that is seen to create invisible minorities is not unlike those of Japan and Korea discussed above. However, the countries of new accession, too, are going through a demographic transition and will soon experience labour shortages of their own. Poland is already importing workers from the Ukraine, for example. This will not provide a long-term solution to the demand for unskilled labour, particularly if the development of these countries accelerates with accession. As in the case of Asia, the assumption is that migrants, and especially unskilled migrants, can be supplied through a continuous system of temporary labour migration. Whether such systems can be prevented from becoming more permanent migration is a moot point but history is hardly encouraging and, again, the gap between policy objectives and outcomes looms large.
Castles (2006), however, identifies a more unsavoury dimension to the issue of unskilled migrant policy in arguing that governments may come to depend upon irregular migrants for unskilled workers. Rather than design instruments that are ultimately flawed, it is easier to turn a blind eye to a reservoir of labour that has entered the country illegally, as many countries in Asia do today. Thus, here may be an aspect of ‘non-policy’ convergence across the developed world. The pool of unskilled labour and the legal temporary migrants, constantly turning over, provide the basis for the development of a permanent underclass in the developed world, which, in turn, will generate severe problems of social integration and fundamental contradictions between immigration and integration policies. Such a strategy, even covertly implemented, would not appear to be in the best interests of destination countries. Not only would it be against any rights principles held by the state and deprive migrants of access to social protection but it would also maintain a significant proportion of the working population beyond the tax-gathering net.

**Migration and Development**

Rarely do governments take into consideration the implications that their immigration policies might have on the countries of origin of the migrants they accept. The exception has been research on skilled migration and the impact that the exodus of the highly skilled has on developing countries that is often framed around the 'brain drain' argument, although, even here, it is rare that results of studies have been reflected in policy. One possible example was the decision by the Department of Health in the United Kingdom not to recruit health professionals from 154 developing countries on the assumption that their loss would prejudice the health services of those countries (OECD 2004). However, recent research has posed questions not only about the effectiveness of such policies of discriminatory recruitment, but also their morality (see Skeldon 2005). The most recent policy-related research on migration and development has drawn attention to the potential of migration to act to the benefit of countries of both origin and destination, as well as to the migrants themselves, the so-called 'win, win, win' solution. Despite the vocabulary, such work does not seek to ignore the potential risks of migration but to emphasize the considerable benefits that can also occur. The report of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005) reflected much of this work as a prelude to the High-level Dialogue called by the Secretary-General of the United Nations...
in September 2006. Policy work at the highest level will continue through the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the first meeting of which was held in Brussels in July 2007.

At the risk of oversimplifying a complex dialogue, perhaps two major areas of policy concern have emerged above all others: remittances and diasporas. The emphasis on remittances is easy to understand: they form one of the most significant global flows to developing countries, constituting some US$126 billion in 2004 (Ratha 2005: 21). While smaller than foreign direct investment, they exceeded official development assistance through most of the 1990s. Remittances have also increased markedly in recent years, increasing by about 50 per cent over the five years to 2004 (GCIM 2005: 26). It is known that remittances can contribute to a reduction in poverty and unemployment and improve the quality of life of those in communities of origin. Considerable research findings on this topic have emerged from the state of Kerala in South India, from other parts of South Asia and elsewhere (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan 2003, the essays in Siddiqui 2005 and Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Policy instruments to reduce the transaction costs of sending money or to augment the monies sent back from local and national governments in schemes such as the ‘three-for-one’ programme in Mexico in which three dollars are added for every one sent back by groups of migrants are to be welcomed. However, remittances can exacerbate inequalities both within communities and between regions.

Two other considerations also argue for careful assessment of the situation before policy intervention in remittance flows is accepted as beneficial. First, it needs to be clearly recognized that remittances are private flows of money between migrants and their families and any attempts by governments to ‘manage’ the flows in some way, perhaps towards some more productive investment, is likely to be counterproductive. Second, migrants seldom come from, and thus remittances rarely flow back to, the poorest parts of any country. Any attempt by governments to recalibrate their aid flows based upon the flows of remittances must be resisted as aid flows can be channelled towards the poorest and areas of greatest need. Flows destined for individuals and families are therefore very different from those going to governments and to try to shift the former towards the latter is again unlikely to meet with success.
Diaspora is a relatively new area for policy intervention. The term 'diaspora' incorporates the various communities of migrants from any country that are outside that country and forms a transnational network in which money, goods and ideas flow, as well as people. Those who leave developing countries include the best and the brightest, as seen in the discussion of the skilled above. The return of at least some of these, either on a long-term or a short-term basis, to serve their country of origin should help to promote development. Thus, 'tapping into' or 'leveraging' the diaspora are terms used to describe this process of looking to overseas communities for talent, ideas and finance to promote development at home (Kuznetsov 2006). For example, some 35,000 practitioners and 10,000 students in the United States are members of the American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin and some 16,000 trainees from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are estimated to be in the UK's National Health Service. A policy to facilitate even a small number to visit back home on a short-term basis could make an important contribution to maintaining health services in deprived areas.

While return migrants and overseas residents can have a profound impact on their countries of origin, as seen in Asia with groups such as the Overseas Chinese in China, the Viet Kieu in Vietnam or Non-Resident Indians, they only return once something worthwhile exists for them to return to. The institutions must be in place in which they can operate to help both themselves and their countries of origin. To try to promote development through the return of skilled workers in the diaspora seems a little like putting the cart before the horse. The danger with promoting the diaspora is that migration policy is given primacy over development policy and the responsibility of development is shifted from the state to the migrant.

Conversely, development policy will not resolve the question of migration. Development of areas of origin will not stop people leaving. Quite the opposite; emigration is usually positively associated with development, at least initially, or until fertility decline and sustained growth bring about a transition from emigration to immigration, as seen in southern Europe and parts of East Asia. A recent study has placed the numbers of emigrants from the United Kingdom who live overseas at just under 10 per cent of the resident population (Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006). The Philippines, often regarded as a country of emigration *par excellence* is also estimated to have about 10 per cent of its population resident overseas. The point is that migration is a 'normal' feature of human
populations and an integral part of development (Skeldon 1997). Migration flows change in volume, direction and composition over time and in tandem with some kind of development. Policies that seek to block or stop the movement are unlikely to meet with success, while policies designed to optimize the benefits of existing flows are more likely to promote development.

Although policy intervention in the area of migration and development is still ambivalent and will depend very much upon context, perhaps one of the most critical issues that has been brought to the attention of policy makers is that migration cannot simply be seen unilaterally or as a concern for the destination country only. Policies in the migration and development cluster clearly link migrants in the developed world with their country of origin and the potential that they have to influence events, either positively or negatively, back home. However, these policies have also drawn attention to the need to consider countries of origin in the elaboration of immigration policies themselves, particularly in cases where temporary migration programmes are to be implemented. Policies to help migrants to integrate more effectively into societies of destination are likely to have greater success once linkages back to their home areas through transnational networks are appreciated. Equally clearly, humanitarian policies need to be cognizant of conditions back home. That is, the overlap between the clusters, 'nexus' in current parlance (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002) places migration policy in a broader spatial framework. Any attempt to manage migration successfully in any of the clusters depends on bilateral or multilateral cooperation between and among countries and will not succeed if taken unilaterally (see also Martin, Martin and Weil 2006, Martin, Abella and Kuptsch 2006).

INTERNAL MIGRATION

One difference between internal and international migration was seen to be that the former was the result of decisions made by those who go while the latter was the result of decisions made by those who receive. However, with the increasing importance of irregular movements across international borders and the realization that, in some countries, controls on access to certain destinations applies to internal movements too, that distinction begins to erode. For example, internal movements of people were tightly controlled in China and Vietnam at certain times during the recent past: a migration away from the place of registration could only be sanctioned by the
state. With the opening up of the economies of these two states and the emergence of free markets, these controls have become diminished. Nevertheless, many states in other parts of the world have attempted to implement policies to control the internal movements of their populations. 

The clearest difference between internal and international migration lies in their relative magnitude. The number of international migrants in the world was estimated at 190 million in 2005, or about 3 per cent of the total population (United Nations 2006a). The number of internal migrants depends entirely upon the instruments used to measure migration. However, irrespective of the method used, internal migrants vastly outnumber those who have crossed an international border. The number of internal migrants in China alone could be between 100 and 200 million. Hence, to think of migration policy without considering the overwhelming majority of migrants, as seems to have recently been the case, suggests a lack of perspective.

International migration has captured the limelight as it involves movement between two sovereign states whereas internal migration is the responsibility of a single state alone: it is not subject to the 'interference' of other states in the management process. However, in the humanitarian policy cluster, the international community has increasingly become concerned about the plight of internally displaced persons (IDPs) setting a precedent for multilateral involvement in the internal affairs of certain states. Most of these states are considered to be in some kind of crisis but the very discourse of 'failed states' suggests that some states are more sovereign than others. Leaving this issue to one side, the process of globalization has generated a series of linkages between internal and international migration (Skeldon 2006a) that ultimately need to be reflected in policy. For example, when the pool of internal migrants is exhausted, countries may have to turn to external sources to satisfy the demand (Skeldon 2006a). The domestic movement of skilled personnel or a switch in emphasis of domestic training programmes can have an impact on the need to import certain skills. Potential internal and international sources of supply of specific skills need to be considered within a unified policy framework. Thus, it seems appropriate to incorporate a discussion of policies on internal migration into that of those on international migration. Certainly, however, relative to the late 1970s and early 1980s (see, for example, Oberai 1983 and Peek and Standing 1982) attention to policies affecting internal migration has faded when compared to that directed towards international migration policy.
Polices to regulate internal migration generally fall under the heading of population redistribution (United Nations 1981). Discussion of policy on internal migration tends to revolve around two themes: first, the migration to urban areas, the topic thus being part of the extensive literature on urbanization; second, the migration to new areas of land for settlement. Like the discussions of international migration, both these themes are closely related to the evolving structure of the state. Power is centred in urban areas and the evolution of the nation state depends upon the effective projection of influence from the city into the hinterland. The mobility of people through military recruitment, labour recruitment into industry, and education at specific points in the urban hierarchy are integral to this process. Much of this migration is circulatory through which migrants take new ideas and ways of doing things back to the villages. The movement of people into sparsely settled rural areas from the core area of the state of demobilized soldiers or land-hungry peasants who are loyal to the dominant group, is part of this process of political consolidation.

The most common policies relate to those designed to affect movement to the largest city or cities in a country. These can range from ‘closing’ the cities to migrants from the countryside to sending back to villages migrants who are already in the city. Other policy instruments attempt either to improve conditions in rural areas of origin or to create alternative destinations for potential migrants to the largest cities. A sober assessment of the long-term impact of these policies is that they do not work, either because they are politically unsustainable or because they contradict the types of economic policies being pursued by governments, or both. For example, China was able to control its population movement to the cities to a large extent in the 1960s and 1970s. The level of urbanization in the early 1980s was estimated at half what it would have been in the absence of direct controls on mobility (Banister 1987: 326-327). However, with the introduction of reforms from 1979, ‘the largest peacetime movement in history’ (Murphy 2002: 1) was unleashed. Urbanization increased from 19.4 per cent in 1980 to 44.5 per cent in 2005 when some 532 million people were estimated to be living in urban areas in China (United Nations 2006b). Policies to develop the countryside with the objective of slowing out-migration, like the cases of attempts to develop countries of origin in the international context, resulted in increased migration over the long term. Hence, one of the reasons for the decline in recent times in the amount of attention being paid to direct policies that attempt to influence the volume and direction of internal migration is that they do not work over anything but the immediate short term.
CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to review the debate on migration policy and place it within a broad conceptual framework. Four overlapping clusters of migration policies were identified and particular attention was drawn to those relating to migration and development. In a globalizing world, migration policies have increasingly to be implemented within a bilateral or multilateral context if the desired objectives are to be met or the gap between objectives and outcomes is to be reduced. If migration is to be successfully managed, cooperation between origins and destinations will be required and not just in the cluster of policies relating to migration and development. However, the experience of policies on internal migration suggests that direct attempts to influence the direction and volume of movement over all but the short term are unlikely to meet with success. The fact that international migration occurs between two sovereign states does matter and the potential for effective policy outcome through collaboration between governments is greater than where no effective bodies to regulate out-migration exist in village or rural origins in the case of internal migration. Nevertheless, increasing irregular migration suggests that the capacity for regulation at the international level, too, is being eroded even if the magnitude of irregular migration and trafficking are often exaggerated. Indirect policies, often associated with development at both origins and destinations, rather than those that directly seek to limit and control migration, may ultimately be more effective instruments for managing migration.

Finally, the issue remains of the role of research into policy and the design and implementation of policy itself. That is, do policy makers pay any attention to research done by academics seeking to evaluate policy outcome? In a democracy, policy makers respond primarily to public opinion rather than to options that might be politically unpalatable. Thus, yet again, the effectiveness of policy input depends upon state and government structures. Particular government departments may have their own favoured research or policy think tanks, each with their own agendas and each lobbying for influence in one way or another.
REFERENCES


